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Abstract 
This dissertation forms a hypothesis that Blockchain technology is giving rise to a new 
form of enterprise IT governance. Blockchain is a computational design that first 
emerged as the technology underpinning the popular cryptocurrency Bitcoin. Despite 
its use in cryptocurrency, it has an array of different use cases that may significantly 
impact the global economy. Some areas that Blockchain will affect were never truly 
re-engineered by the internet era, namely Economics and Governance. This 
dissertation is a qualitative exploration and analysis of blockchain’s impact on 
Information Technology Governance. The research unpacks these implications by 
comparing governance in hierarchical organisations and decentralised autonomous 
organisations. The primary data is attained through a questionnaire and the secondary 
data from a case study. The research contains two literature reviews on Blockchain 
and IT governance. The primary finding of this research reveals that although 
conventional IT Governance will still be used in the future, fifty percent of the 
sentiments shared by subject matter experts indicate that unconventional governance 
will take precedence with decentralised autonomous organisations. This implies that 
changes in traditional governance frameworks may be required in the future. 
Keywords: Information Technology Governance, Blockchain, Distributed Ledger 
Technology, Decentralised Autonomous Organisations 
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1. Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
1.1.1. Background 
There has been a growth in the use of Blockchain technology since 2008. Experts 
believe this shift in computing paradigms may result in the re-engineering of 
economics and governance (Swan, 2015; Tapscott, 2015; Mougayar & Buterin, 2016).  
This shift began with a cryptocurrency called Bitcoin- a currency not backed by a 
central authority (Swan, Blockchain - A Blueprint for a New Economy, 2015). Bitcoin 
exists on a digital public ledger known as Blockchain. The technology is built with a 
self-policing security policy that uses cryptography to secure transactions (Swan, 
Blockchain - A Blueprint for a New Economy, 2015).  
Between 2008 - 2017, there have been numerous Blockchain innovations launched 
following the success of Bitcoin. Examples include advanced supply chain systems 
that promote transparency and traceability in logistics (IBM, 2017), as well as 
crowdfunding systems where donations and transactions are publicly visible (Rosic, 
2017).  Experts are exploring the answers to questions like “Will there one day be a 
need to provide assurance over the algorithms, code and smart contracts that 
underpin this technology?” (Thomson Reuters, 2017). Another question they ask is 
“How will these new technologies be regulated?” (Deloitte, 2017.). These types of 
questions have sparked the curiosity and desire to explore the possibilities as well as 
highlight the challenges of this topic. 
Blockchain technology could become an embedded economic layer of the web that 
serves as a foundation for payments and any form of decentralised value exchange. 
The potential benefits of Blockchain are more than just economic—they extend into 
political, humanitarian, social, and scientific domains (Swan, Blockchain - A Blueprint 
for a New Economy, 2015). With the potential to re-engineer all human endeavours as 
pervasively as the internet boom did.  
This dissertation focuses on the nature of Blockchain, the developments that have 
caused disruptions and how Information Technology Governance (ITG) frameworks 
such as the Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies (COBIT), 
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may need to extend their principles and guidelines to incorporate decentralised 
autonomous organisations.   
1.1.2. Research Goals 
The goal of this research is to develop an inductive theory that substantiates the 
premise that Blockchain could disrupt the conventional role of IT directors in 
organisations that transition to or operate entirely on this technology, thereby 
impacting IT governance.  
1.1.3. Research Objectives 
The main objective of this study is to provide a sound hypothesis based on the 
premise. The intention is to prove that through this disruption Blockchain could lead to 
the evolution of traditional governance frameworks. The following research objectives 
highlight from which angles this topic is addressed: 
Objective 1 - Explain the conventional ITG Frameworks by using COBIT as the main 
frame of reference. 
Objective 2 - Explain what Blockchain technology is and discuss its implications.  
Objective 3 - Conduct an in-depth case study on an existing Blockchain application 
that challenges governance.  
Objective 4 - Identify patterns and processes that could substitute conventional IT 
governance.  
Objective 5 - Identify the impact that Blockchain could have on IT governance in the 
future.  
1.1.4. Research Questions 
This inductive research aims to formulate a valid hypothesis surrounding the impact 
of Blockchain by answering the following questions: 
• How are enterprises governed on Blockchains? 
• Are IT governance frameworks like COBIT fully applicable in Blockchain 
organisations? 
• What are the future implications of the technology on roles like Chief 
Information Officer (CIO) and Chief Technology Officer (CTO)? 
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1.1.5. Layout 
The remainder of this chapter is laid out as follows: 
The problem statement is discussed in the next section, followed by a synopsis of the 
research process to be conducted. The research deliverables are then listed and 
explained. Finally, the layout of the dissertation is explained in the last section of this 
chapter. 
1.2. Problem Statement 
Given the rise of Blockchain technology, the chosen subject is relevant and 
applicable to industry professionals for the following reason: 
In the IT field, there are certain epistemological issues surrounding the nature and 
scope of knowledge when it comes to physical and virtual domains, where the 
relationship between the two variables is unconfirmed (Swan & De Filippi, Toward a 
Philosophy on Blockchain: A Symposium, 2017).  
Due to the different natures of these two worlds, it can be challenging to establish 
correspondence between the two. This is because the virtual world is more 
quantitative (digital ones and zeros), and the physical world is qualitative (chaotic, 
variable, irrational) (Swan & De Filippi, Toward a Philosophy on Blockchain: A 
Symposium, 2017).  
One implication of transferring value with Blockchain networks instead of relying on 
human-based institutions is that intermediaries may become obsolete (Swan & De 
Filippi, Toward a Philosophy on Blockchain: A Symposium, 2017). Consequently, the 
institutional structure of society could possibly shift to one that is computationally 
based (Swan, Blockchain - A Blueprint for a New Economy, 2015) , thus reducing the 
need for institutions to be governed by humans.  
In saying that, and with a lack of widespread knowledge on these ideologies, there is 
little guidance on the implications of Blockchain on ITG, particularly for roles like the 
CIO and the CTO. In due course, different studies may come to identify the 
computational equivalents of human-based qualities that are held by CIOs and CTOs, 
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such as tacit knowledge, values, ethics, strategic thinking and intuition. For now, we 
are still in the early days (Swan,2015).  
With that being said, it is important to note that continuous exploration is required to 
address the various implications of decentralisation and distributed ledger technology 
in society. 
1.3. Research Process 
The focus of this qualitative research process has been on gaining insight and 
identifying patterns from subject matter experts, literature reviews and a case study. 
Additionally, it has been important for the researcher to immerse herself in the industry 
to fully understand the dynamics and ideology of decentralisation. The following 
research process was used to develop the main theory: 
1. Exploration: Examining the Empirical World 
Inductive reasoning begins with detailed observations of the world, which 
moves towards more abstract generalisations and ideas (Dudovskiy, 2011). 
This phase lays the foundation of the research by examining the appropriate 
variables and their relationships. The result of this phase was captured in 
Chapter 2 and 3, Literature reviews on Blockchain technology and IT 
governance.  
2. Designing a Research Strategy 
This phase is demonstrated in Chapter 4, Research Methodology and Design. 
This process involved designing an appropriate research approach by exploring 
different philosophies and selecting the most suitable one for this research. 
Chapter 4 also details the selection of research strategies, data collection 
methods, techniques.  
3. Data Collection: Gathering Evidence  
This step involved gathering qualitative data from subject matter experts. 
Blockchain experts were approached and asked to complete a questionnaire 
on the implications of Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAO) on the 
role of IT Directors. The data was gathered online. To support this primary data, 
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secondary data was gathered through a case study of an existing Blockchain 
platform called DAOStack.  
4. Data Analysis: Analysing the Evidence 
This phase entailed a thematic analysis of the primary data and a comparative 
analysis of the secondary data. From this analysis, inferences and 
recommendations were made. This is documented in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. 
5. Developing a Theory 
The inductive approach requires that the emergence of the hypothesis be 
based on the data collected. A substantial body of qualitative data was 
synthesised and used to formulate concepts that are summarised in Chapter 7. 
1.4. Research Deliverables 
The researcher aims to propose that the comprehensive deliverable, the dissertation 
itself, highlights the topic holistically when all chapters and deliverables are 
considered. The dissertation consists of smaller deliverables laid out as follows: 
1.4.1. Literature Reviews 
The literature studies in this dissertation focus on IT Governance and on Blockchain 
Technology. These studies are based on published books, articles and governance 
guidelines. It is important to note that neither the author’s interest in Blockchain nor its 
rising popularity in commerce should constitute the sound justification for these 
studies. However, the refined and carefully selected literature highlight relevant and 
imminent challenges that may affect the structure of future organisations. Chapter 2 
and 3 provide in-depth explanations of Blockchain as well as of IT governance 
frameworks, particularly, COBIT and ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure 
Library). 
1.4.2. Case Study 
In an effort to highlight real world examples of the applications of Blockchain and 
governance, a holistic case study was completed on a Blockchain based network for 
collective intelligence called DAOStack. This case study aims to establish the 
relevance of roles such as the CIO and CTO in DAOs.   
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1.4.3. Data Analysis 
One of the key deliverables in this research is the data analysis chapter which 
systematically synthesises qualitative data using a method called thematic coding. 
Central to this method is the development of a coding template, which summarises 
themes identified by the researcher as important in a data set (Brooks & King, 2017). 
These themes are then organised in a meaningful and useful manner to address the 
dissertation topic.  
1.4.4. Recommendations 
The intention of the research is to develop objective and relevant interpretations of the 
data collected and of the literature reviews. The recommendations, which form part of 
Chapter 6 and 7, serve as an extrapolation of the data analysis. Through these 
recommendations the author provides suggestions that address the problem 
statement and can be applied in businesses, educational institutions, communities and 
governments. This deliverable brings the most value to readers who might want to 
understand how governance must be applied in DAOs and enterprises that make use 
of Blockchain in some form or another.   
1.5. Dissertation Layout 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The best way to read this dissertation is 
to follow each chapter sequentially to understand the context and assumptions. The 
list of chapters and their value is summarised in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1: Dissertation Layout 
Chapter Title Description 
1 Dissertation Introduction  Provides the background information and 
motivation for the research. Introduces the 
research topic, problem statement and details 
the layout of the dissertation.  
2 Literature Review on ITG  Investigates the discipline of ITG to provide 
background for the subsequent chapters. 
3 Literature Review on 
Blockchain  
Investigates Blockchain technology to provide 
context and background for the subsequent 
chapters. 
4 Research Methodology 
and Design  
Provides information on best scientific 
research practices. The researcher’s acquired 
knowledge from this exercise enables her to 
make informed decisions whilst forming the 
research design.  
5 Case Study on DAOStack Investigates a real-world application of 
Blockchain where governance is 
programmable.  It includes a comparative 
analysis of decision-making factors in DAOs 
versus in Hierarchical organisations.  
6 Data Collection and 
Analysis 
Synthesises and analyses the empirical data 
collected from primary and secondary data.  
7 Dissertation Conclusion  Concludes the research by summarising the 
deliverables and presenting the unique value 
of the findings. The chapter also includes 
closing statements and key takeaways. 
The next chapter is an introduction to ITG, in the form of a comprehensive literature 
review.  
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2. Chapter 2 - Information Technology Governance 
2.1. Introduction 
For a long time, organisations around the world have been working to define ITG 
(Tabacek, IT Governance Roundtable : IT Governance Frameworks, 2008). Over time 
that definition has changed. In the early 2000’s ITG was defined as the measurement 
and control of enterprise IT but has since evolved to providing frameworks, 
mechanisms and methodologies for aligning business needs while delivering 
sustainable enterprise IT (De Haes & Van Grembergen, 2016). 
ITG not only helps directors make better decisions, but also encourages leaders to 
control and monitor structures, processes and responsibilities required to keep a 
company’s IT infrastructure afloat (Howard, IT GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS, 
2008).  
2.1.1. Background 
The current climate of enterprise IT and its cost implications has set a high expectation 
on IT resources around the globe (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2017; Deloitte , 2017). 
However, it is important to note that in any organisation, leadership of IT must begin 
at a board level (Von Holms & Von Holms, 2008). 
This literature review defines ITG, explores ways to effectively implement its 
frameworks, as well as discusses some best practices. Moreover, this review reveals 
that the general consensus from experts is that ITG has become undeniably significant 
in all enterprises, especially with the adoption of emerging technologies. 
2.1.2. Goal 
The goal of this chapter is to lay the research foundation for the dissertation by 
exploring various literature studies on ITG. This chapter covers ITG and its subset - 
Information Security Governance (ISG) – before it delves into the COBIT framework 
in detail.  
2.1.3. Chapter Layout  
The first section of this chapter focuses on defining ITG and exploring different 
frameworks. This section also describes corporate governance, ITG and ISG. The 
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second section examines the principles of COBIT. The last section discusses the 
evolution and modern-day use of ITG and how enterprises can be more efficient by 
combining different governance frameworks. 
2.2. Defining ITG  
2.2.1. Corporate Governance  
To better understand ITG, it is necessary to define corporate governance. This is 
because ITG is a subcategory of corporate governance. Corporate governance is 
defined as a system by which a company is directed and controlled (International 
Compliance Training, 2015; ICAEW, 2018).  
The purpose of corporate governance is to facilitate decision making that supports the 
long-term success of a company by ensuring effective and prudent management. The 
responsibility lies on the board of directors of a company. The board is typically 
appointed by shareholders and or stakeholders. Members of the board are collectively 
responsible for setting the company’s strategic goals and providing the leadership to 
put them into effect. They are also responsible for supervising the management of the 
business. 
The actions taken by the board of directors sets the precedence for the company’s 
values and objectives. This ultimately affects the integral parts of the system, including 
IT governance (Von Holms & Von Holms, 2008).    
In 1998, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an 
intergovernmental economic organisation representing 35 countries, established its 
own principles of corporate governance (OECD, 1999). This set of corporate 
governance standards and guidelines were agreed on in 1999 and have since formed 
the basis for corporate governance in OECD and non-OECD countries (International 
Compliance Training, 2015).  
2.2.2. ITG  
In 1998, the Information Technology Governance Institute (ITGI) was established as 
an arm of the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA). ITGI 
developed COBIT with an aim to advance the standards and approaches in directing 
and controlling IT within enterprises (I.T Governance Institute, 2013). 
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Over the years, COBIT along with other frameworks have helped mould the definition 
of ITG. Its origins were in control and measurement, but it has since moved and 
progressed into front-end planning and putting processes in place (Tabacek, IT 
GOVERNANCE ROUNDTABLE: IT GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS, 2008). ITG is 
now more a preventative discipline; it provides a framework for conducting business 
and guides decision makers in monitoring the progress and controlling business 
alignment with IT.  
The governance of IT requires that mechanisms and methodologies involve people 
and that there is compliance with rules and regulations (Howard, 2008; Gartner 2012). 
It is the responsibility of the board of directors to meet and deliberate how ITG should 
take place within their organisation (Howard, IT GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORKS, 
2008). 
As in integral part of enterprise governance, ITG consists of the leadership and 
organisational structures that promote the organisations IT by extending the strategies 
and objectives throughout the organisation (ISACA, 2008).  
Although variations of the definition can be found in numerous literatures (SAICA, 
2017), fundamentally the definitions comprise of the following aspects: 
• Accountability of IT 
• IT compliance to rules and regulations 
• Satisfying the needs of the board and stakeholders 
• Managing IT risk 
• Providing value to the business and control of work done 
2.2.3. ITG Frameworks 
There are three widely recognised vendor neutral frameworks that are used for ITG 
(IT Governance, n.d.). Although these individual frameworks can be used on their own, 
they are often used in combination because of their unique governance strengths (Hill 
et al., 2006). Below is a list of these three frameworks with a brief history of each: 
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I. ITIL 
The Information Technology Infrastructure library (ITIL) was first developed in the 
1980’s by the United Kingdom’s Cabinet office (ITIL Central, n.d.). The office was 
tasked with developing a framework for efficient and financially responsible use of IT 
resources within the British government and the private sector (ITIL Central, n.d.). ITIL 
is supported by ISO/IEC2000:2011 (IT Governance, n.d.). 
II. COBIT 
COBIT was created by ISACA. The fifth iteration of COBIT was released in 2012. It is 
an ITG control framework that guides organisations in meeting today’s business 
challenges. It focuses on regulatory compliance, alignment of IT Strategies with 
business objectives and risk management. 
III. ISO 27002 
ISO 27002 is supported by ISO 27001, was created by the International Organisation 
for Standardization in 1995 (Rouse, 2013). It is a popular global best practice standard 
that focuses primarily on information security. The framework outlines 144 potential 
controls and mechanisms, which may be implemented subject to the guidance 
provided within ISO 27001 (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2013).  
2.2.4. Information Security Governance  
ISG is the responsibility of the board of directors and senior executives (Von Holms & 
Von Holms, 2008) and it forms part of the ITG framework (I.T Governance Institute, 
2013). The rising tide of cybercrime and threats to critical information assets dictate 
that boards of directors and senior executives are fully engaged at governance level 
to ensure the security and integrity of those resources (Hufstedler, 2013). 
The approach to ISG is to ensure that processes operate effectively from end to end, 
by minimising hidden risks. The following is a list of best practices of ISG (Diligent 
Corporation, 2016): 
• Take a unified view of how ISG can impact your organisation. 
• Create information security awareness and provide training. 
• Constantly monitor and measure the organisation’s information security. 
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• Maintain open communications with stakeholders. 
• Promote adaptability and agility. 
I. The Importance of ISG 
The main goal of information security is to reduce the adverse impacts of acceptable 
levels of risks. (I.T Governance Institute, 2013). Information security ensures there is 
a protection of information assets. These should be protected from risk of loss, misuse, 
unauthorised access, damage or operational discontinuity (Morgan S. , 2017). It 
should also aim to protect assets from ever changing civil or legal liabilities that an 
organisation may face due to mismanagement (Von Holms & Von Holms, 2008).  
Given the increase in cybercrimes such as phishing, malware and ransomware, few 
organisations are aware of the need for improved security measures (Morgan S. , 
2017). Information security addresses three principal factors, namely confidentiality, 
availability and integrity throughout information life cycles (Von Holms & Von Holms, 
2008).  
The requirement to create a robust ISG framework continues to grow in the 
foreseeable future (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2013). By the 
beginning of 2018 alone, ISG spending has hit a worldwide high of USD93 billion 
dollars (Gartner , Morgan, 2018).  Gartner’s forecast on the cost of ISG includes 
corporate IT and categories such as outsourcing of IT security, consulting and 
implementation and data loss prevention to name a few (Morgan S. , 2017).  
These figures indicate the impact and significance that information security has on 
organisations around the world. However, improving security is not just about 
spending on recent technologies (Deshpande, 2017). There has been a steady rise of 
security incidents around the globe, with PWC reported that the US Department of 
Homeland Security has identified more than 60 entities in US critical infrastructure 
where damage, caused by a single cyber incident, could reasonably result in $50 
billion in economic damages (Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2017). 
Further research has found that the use of Blockchain is more likely to be relevant in 
determining the integrity of transactions and may be critical in the Governance of 
Information Security (US National Security Telecommunications Advisory, 2017). 
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Organisations such as giant retailer Target have drastically improved their information 
security after a security breach in 2013 by completely reshuffling their board of 
directors and brining in new senior leadership with cyber security know-how (Gagliordi, 
2017). These examples demonstrate that there is a vast need for effective ISG and 
ITG in enterprises around the globe.  
2.3. ITG in Modern Enterprises 
Governance is not just about making the right decision every time, it is about the 
process of decision-making (Chavira, 2017). Good processes ensure that when 
something goes wrong (or right) it is easier to trace what happened. This is something 
stakeholders want to be confident of before giving an organisation their buy-in (Molina, 
2017). Organisations operate in internal and external environments simultaneously 
(Orbus Software, 2014), thereby increasing the impact of decisions made. For 
instance, one of the most common topics that customers of the European multinational 
software corporation, SAP, seek is to improve the overall performance of IT 
management (Shuptar, 2012).  
Based on the definition of corporate governance, ITG can be described as having two 
distinct components i.e. a structural and process component. The structural 
component is the way technology activities are in alignment with business goals. The 
process component defines the rights and responsibilities of IT decision makers.  
Assets such as relationships and ITG mechanisms form part of the process 
components, by answering the question of ‘how’ an organisation is governed (Shuptar, 
2012). The structural components, such as mechanisms and systems put in place to 
enforce rules, the ‘who’ and ‘what’ (Shuptar, 2012). 
The significance of ITG permeates right through to the financial and legal sectors of 
an organisation. This is due to the fact that many organisations have become 
dependent on information, communications and technology (ICT) (Giles, 2016). It is 
an essential element in making money, improving the customer experience, ensuring 
compliance and managing employees. 
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An ITG framework answers some key questions, such as; how the IT department is 
functioning overall? Which key metrics does management require to be effective? How 
can the return on IT investments be measured in an organisation? (Eshna, 2016). 
It cannot be stressed enough that ITG is an on-going journey that will continually 
evolve (Tiglias, 2014). 
2.4. COBIT Principles  
The most recent version of COBIT is based on five principles that are essential for the 
effective management and governance of enterprise IT (IT Governance, n.d.). These 
principles are discussed in the following section: 
2.4.1. Principle 1: Meeting stakeholder needs 
Creating value is a priority for stakeholders, because it allows the organisation to 
maintain a balance between the optimisation of risk and realisation of benefits and use 
of resources (ISACA, 2012). The enterprise’s IT goals are used to formalise a structure 
that the stakeholders rely on. 
COBIT 5 provides some of the following required processes and enablers to support 
business value creation using IT. The COBIT guidelines can be customised to suit the 
needs of different organisations. This can be achieved by using the goals cascade. 
The cascade translates stakeholder needs into precise actionable goals within the 
context of the enterprise, IT related goals. 
2.4.2. Principle 2: Covering the enterprise end to end 
This principle explains how COBIT integrates governance of enterprise IT into 
corporate governance. All functions and processes within an enterprise are briefly 
discussed in Principle 5. The end-to-end governance approach lies at the foundation 
of the COBIT framework. The key components such as benefits realisation, risk and 
resource optimisation, as well as roles, activities and enablers (ISACA, 2012):  
 
  
Chapter 2 - Information Technology Governance 
15 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Governance and Management in COBIT 5 
I. Governance Enablers 
The organisational resources of governance lie in its enablers (ISACA, 2012). A lack 
of enablers may affect the ability to create value. Given the importance of governance 
enablers, COBIT 5 includes a single way of dealing with enablers that are discussed 
in Principle four (Enabling a holistic approach). 
 
II. Governance Scope 
It is possible to apply governance through different views, thus making it essential to 
define the scope of a governance system. COBIT 5 is designed to deal with different 
views of governance. It can be applied to an entire enterprise or a tangible or intangible 
asset. For example, an organisation that offers an online service requires a tailored 
governance system as opposed to an organisation that offers a physical manufactured 
product in the real world. 
III. Roles, Activities and Relationships 
The roles, activities and relationships aspect of the governance model defines who is 
involved in governance and how they are involved i.e. what their responsibilities and 
activities are and how they interact. A clear differentiation is made between the roles 
within governance and management activities.  
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2.4.3. Principle 3: Applying a single integrated framework 
COBIT 5 is aligned with relevant other frameworks and standards such as ITIL, 
ISO27000 series and PRINCE II to name a few. This is important because it allows 
users of COBIT to have an overarching governance framework integrator (ISACA, 
2012). It serves as a consistent and integrated source of guidance in a non-technical 
language. 
2.4.4. Principle 4: Enabling a holistic approach 
COBIT defines a set of enablers to support the implementation of a comprehensive 
and management system (Garsoux, 2013). The enablers consist of factors that 
individually or collectively influence the workability of a process. These enablers are 
driven by the goals cascade, whereby higher-level IT-related goals define what the 
different enablers should achieve (Orbus, 2016). They include: 
1. Principles, policies and frameworks; 
2. Processes; 
3. Organisational structures; 
4. Culture, ethics and behaviour; 
5. Information; 
6. Services, infrastructure and applications; 
7. People, skills and competencies. 
In terms of interconnectedness, enablers must be considered because each enabler 
needs the input of another enabler to be fully effective (Orbus, 2016). For example, 
processes need information and organisation structures need skills and behaviour. 
Together, the principles and enablers allow an organisation to align its IT investments 
with its objectives to realise the value of those investments (IT Governance, n.d.). 
As part of the overall study, the processes that allow directors to enable a holistic 
approach are significant for the subsequent chapters. COBIT 5 identifies five main 
governance process, they are as follows: 
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Table 2.1: ITG Processes 
Process Code Name 
EDM01 Ensure Governance Framework Setting and Maintenance 
EDM02 Ensure Benefits Delivery 
EDM03 Ensure Risk Optimisation 
EDM04 Ensure Resource Optimisation 
EDM05 Ensure Stakeholder Transparency 
 
2.4.5. Principle 5: Separating governance from management 
Some scholars argue that there is no difference between management and 
governance, however, they are not to be confused because they are not the same 
(Bourne, 2015). COBIT advocates that enterprises implement governance and 
management by covering separate areas of work. The framework makes a clear 
distinction between governance and management. Figure 2.2 illustrates this 
distinction. 
 
Figure 2.2: COBIT 5 Governance and Management Key Areas 
An understanding of the difference between management and governance is critical 
for advocacy to be effective (Bourne, 2015). These two disciplines encompass several 
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types of activities and require different organisational structures and serve different 
purposes (ISACA, 2012). 
The primary focus of the governing body should be to balance the competing interests 
of its stakeholder community (Bourne, 2015). According to COBIT (2016), governance 
is the responsibility of the board of directors under the leadership of the chairperson, 
and management is the responsibility of the executive management under the 
leadership of the CEO. 
Management concerns the daily operations of the programme within context of the 
strategies, policies and processes that are enforced by the board of directors. 
Whereas governance is about “doing the right thing”, management focuses on “doing 
things right” (Tricker, 2000). 
Figure 2.2 highlights the reference model for governance and management. IT 
Governance contains five processes that fall under the Evaluate, Direct and Monitor 
(EDM) categories. These will serve as the basis for the evaluation of governance in 
decentralised autonomous organisations in the subsequent chapters. Management 
contains four domains that cover planning, building, running and monitoring (PBRM). 
These are auxiliary processes that support but do not form part of the core governance 
discipline. Nevertheless, they are useful to consider in the evaluation of DAOs. 
2.5. Combining COBIT, ITIL and ISO27002 
Nearly all IT enterprises feel the need to gain or increase control, predictability, and 
efficiency (Alcyone, 2005). COBIT and ITIL together are a powerful force for IT 
Operational efficiency and effectiveness (Hill et al., 2006). 
In general, COBIT is used for auditing purposes and ITIL is used to improve processes 
(ISACA, 2012). It is most effective to combine both at the initial stages of process 
improvement activities (Alcyone, 2005). For example, the COBIT framework leaves it 
to the organisation to define processes and procedures using the guidelines of 
software release policy as a control point. Due to its high-level coverage, COBIT can 
act as an integrator that brings disparate practices under one framework. It thereby 
helps to link strategic business practices (Hill et al., 2006). 
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ITIL, on the other hand, defines the best practices associated with Software Release 
Management. It describes how to implement Software Release Management within IT 
Outsourcing, as well as interfaces to other activities such as Infrastructure 
Deployment, Change Management and Configuration Management. 
Enterprises that want to put their ITIL programme into the context of a wider control 
and governance framework should use COBIT (Gartner, 2002). This indicates that 
COBIT and ITIL are not mutually exclusive and can provide a powerful ITG guide. 
The value of combining governance frameworks can be demonstrated in the following 
review. The following describes a typical public company’s IT organisation and change 
drivers: 
• Auditors often advise companies that their teams are not doing something right 
and structural changes are necessary.  
• Businesses do not understand their needs or are not responsive to external 
changes.  
• Executives want to make the IT organisation more cost effective by making 
improvements that fall within the year’s operating budget. 
ITIL and COBIT can enable organisations to achieve three objectives (Hill et al., 2006): 
• Establish IT service management processes that can help achieve business 
and compliance objectives. 
• Determine clear process goals and provide a means of measuring progress 
against them. 
• Ensure that ITG is effective at process level. Empower IT departments to meet 
or exceeds the needs of external regulators.  
The best practices in ITIL focus on methods and define a more comprehensive set of 
processes than COBIT, providing a roadmap for building those processes. However, 
it is still beneficial to make use of COBIT in conjunction with ITIL. COBIT helps 
organisations mould the ITIL processes to the business needs and goals of the 
organisation. It helps the organisation to determine where the organisation is now and 
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where the organisation should be in future. Knowing the goals, IT managers can then 
activate business objectives. 
Below are some steps that can facilitate aligning governance frameworks such as 
COBIT, ITIL and ISO27002 (Office Governance Commerce, IT Governance, IT 
Service Management Forum, 2005). 
2.5.1. Tailoring 
• Using all three governance frameworks can help support governance by 
providing a management policy and control framework, ensure there is a return 
on investments and optimise costs (Hill et al., 2006). It can also help identify 
significant risks and assign responsibility for these risks, thereby efficiently 
organising resources to their sufficient capabilities (ISACA, 2012).  
• Tailoring standards and policies based on the three frameworks can also help 
in defining service and project requirements. For example, setting clear IT 
objectives and metrics, or creating service level agreements (SLA) and 
contracts that can be scrutinised by clients. Specific guidelines on this can be 
found on ITIL and ISO27002 (Valentic, 2015).   
• Tailoring the frameworks to a company’s needs can ensure that the capabilities 
and competency of providers are properly verified. This can be done by 
contractual commitments or independent audits. 
2.5.2. Prioritising 
To avoid unfocused implementation of best practices, it is important that organisations 
prioritise how standards and practices are applied as well where they are applied. It is 
also important that the board of directors take ownership of ITG (Von Holms & Von 
Holms, 2008) and set a direction for the rest of the organisation to follow. To do this, 
the board can do the following (Office Governance Commerce, IT Governance, IT 
Service Management Forum, 2005): 
• Ensure that IT stays on the board agenda. 
• Ensure managers uncovered and address IT issues. 
• Insist that the performance of IT is measured and reported. 
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• Establish IT Steering group or council. 
• Help align IT imitative with business needs. 
• Enforce a management framework is applied.  
2.5.3. Planning 
Planning is an activity that lies on IT managers, they can enforce all three governance 
frameworks by following the steps suggested (Office Governance Commerce, IT 
Governance, IT Service Management Forum, 2005): 
1. Set up an organisational framework with clear objectives and list 
responsibilities. 
2. Establish the current business objectives that IT is contributing to. This helps 
obtain a firm understanding of the business environment and the risk appetite. 
COBIT’s management guidelines (Key Goal Indicators) address this step 
specifically. Used in conjunction with ITIL, SLA’s can be defined to meet end-
user terms. 
3. Define and understand IT related risks. 
4. Define target areas that are critical to managing the risks identified. For this 
step, COBIT’s process frameworks can be used as a basis, which is 
underpinned by ITIL’s service delivery processes and ISO27002’s security 
objectives. These frameworks together help in assessing risks at the four main 
levels i.e. strategic, programme, project or operational. 
5. Identify gaps in current capabilities. This can be done by performing capability 
assessments to establish where the improvements are required the most. 
6. Put together improvement strategies and prioritise projects that contribute to 
the improvement of the areas defined in the previous steps. 
7. Measure results by establishing mechanism to keep score of performance. 
COBIT’s Key Performance Indicators can be used as a basis for this. It is 
important to consider the following: 
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a. Whether or not the organisation structure support strategy 
implementation. 
b. Who is responsible for risk management?  
c. Whether or not there is an existing infrastructure to facilitate and support 
the creation of business information. 
d. If goals are effectively communicated throughout the organisation.  
8. Repeat steps two to seven regularly. 
2.5.4. Avoiding Pitfalls 
Management ought to follow some pragmatic but essential rules while making use of 
all three frameworks. It is vital to treat the implementation of framework guides as a 
regular activity, as opposed to a “once off” step.  
• The implementation will likely involve cultural changes; therefore, a key factor 
is enablement, and motivation.  
• Avoid the imitative coming across as an exercise that is purely bureaucratic. 
• Avoid the unfocused approach. 
• Focus on areas that require the easiest change and build incrementally from 
there. 
• Manage the expectations from all stakeholders. 
2.5.5. Aligning Best Practices 
The common theme in all three governance frameworks is that the best practices need 
to be aligned and integrated with the businesses’ requirements. COBIT can be used 
as an overall control framework, and ITIL and ISO27002 can be leveraged to address 
discrete areas.  
2.6. Conclusion  
From the literature reviewed in this chapter, it is clear that ITG is not a one-time 
exercise or something that can be achieved by mandates alone. It requires the board’s 
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commitment and a clear set of objectives and direction. As mentioned in COBIT, ITG 
must be incorporated into corporate governance. 
The governance of enterprise IT spans over principles, policies and processes, 
organisational structures, cultures and ethics. Therefore, it is important that ITG 
addresses key areas such as strategic alignment, value delivery, risk and resource 
management, as well as performance measurement (I.T Governance Institute, 2013).  
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3. Chapter 3 – Blockchain Technology 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores the technical and theoretical aspects of Blockchain. The chapter 
discusses how this technology goes beyond the use of cryptocurrencies (Blockchain 
1.0) and smart contracts (Blockchain 2.0) and into distributed computing and 
disintermediation in various economic sectors (Blockchain 3.0).  
3.1.1. Background 
The roots of Blockchain stem back to the year 1991 (Springer, 1991). The very first 
work of cryptographically secured chain of blocks was documented by two computer 
scientists by the name of Stuart Haber and Scott Stornetta (Springer, 1991). The two 
proposed a computationally practical time stamping service to certify when a 
document was created or last changed. This technique made it not feasible for a user 
to back-date or forward a date a document but ensured the complete privacy and 
confidentiality of documents (Haber & Stornetta, 1991). Moreover, the time-stamping 
service would keep no record of the actual time-stamped documents. 
Since then, numerous IT innovations have been developed using Blockchain and 
experts describe it as set of distributed databases known as “blocks” that contain 
records of digital transactions (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). These interconnected 
blocks support the decentralisation of systems and ensure that data is securely 
distributed and publicly visible. Many refer to Blockchain as a public distributed ledger.  
Examples of blockchain use cases include advanced supply chain systems that 
promote transparency and traceability in logistics (IBM, 2017), as well as crowd 
funding systems that make donations and transactions publicly visible (Rosic, 2017).  
3.2. Brief History of Blockchain 
Since the emergence of Bitcoin, Blockchain has become synonymous with the 
cryptocurrency. That is because Bitcoin simultaneously represents three different 
things (Swan, 2015). Firstly, Bitcoin can be understood as the underlying Blockchain 
platform. Secondly, Bitcoin can refer to the protocol that runs on top of the Blockchain 
platform. Thirdly, Bitcoin (BTC) is the digital currency, the first cryptocurrency created. 
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Anderson (1996), a computer scientist at Cambridge University contributed to the 
Blockchain idea, which proposed a storage system to prevent denial of service attacks. 
Anderson (1996) presented a problem to cryptology communities that merited further 
study, suggesting limits to the resilience of distributed authentication services, and the 
write-once indexing of large databases. Anderson’s research preceded that of Nick 
Szabo and Stefan Konst who further developed the theory that suggested practical, 
real life uses of Blockchains (Agarwal, 2017). 
More than a decade later, on 31 October 2008, Blockchain was conceptualised into a 
fully functional system. A digital form of data structuring that enabled the sharing of 
public ledgers across a distributed network was introduced to the world through the 
cryptocurrency Bitcoin (Lewis, 2016; Maverick, 2017).  
Following the global economic crisis in 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto (2008), released a 
whitepaper that explained a Blockchain protocol in the form of a Peer to Peer electronic 
cash system.  Although the words “block” and “chain” were never used as one word in 
the original paper, in due course, the term was popularised as a single word 
(Bheemaiah, 2017).  
Blockchain now extends into political, humanitarian, social and scientific domains 
(Lewis, 2016).  The technological capacity of Blockchain has already been harnessed 
by specific groups to address real world problems (Swan, 2015). 
In 2014, a popular discourse began to separate Bitcoin from Blockchain as industries 
recognised the endless number of uses of the technology (Mann, 2016).  This gave 
rise to Blockchain 2.0, a computational concept that allows programmable 
transactions. The Ethereum network is an example of Blockchain 2.0 as it uses a 
computer language to write scripts that implement any computable function (Swan, 
2015). 
Vitalik Buterin, Russian Canadian programmer and writer for the Bitcoin magazine, co-
founded Ethereum; an open source second generation public Blockchain featuring 
smart contracts (Agrawal, Van der Veer, Kirk, & Arnab, 2017).  
To further elaborate the relevance of Blockchain to this study, the next section 
describes the growth and recent developments of blockchain in various sectors. This 
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becomes significant as background information and provides context for the 
subsequent chapters.  
3.2.1. Blockchain Industry 
Soon after the rise of Ethereum, start-ups began introducing Blockchain as enterprise 
solutions. In 2016, thirty of the world’s largest financial institutions collaborated with 
R3; a technology company that leads a consortium of financial institutions, in 
researching Blockchain capabilities in the finance sector (Dalibard, 2017). Together 
they created an international distributed ledger platform known as Corda. Corda 
records and executes institutions’ financial agreements (R3, 2018).  Banks that form 
part of the group reckon the technology has the potential to make faster, more reliable 
payments that are easier to audit (Dalibard, 2017).  
In March 2018, Deutsche Börse Group and HQLAX signed a letter of intent to form a 
strategic partnership for the creation of an innovative securities blending solution that 
makes use of the R3 Corda Blockchain platform (R3, 2018). 
A year after the establishment of R3, the NASDAQ committed to a Blockchain trial, 
which was followed by three legacy financial institutions, namely; Visa, Capital One 
and Fiserv for a Blockchain called Chain. These big moves from the world’s biggest 
financial players signalled the level of corroboration for the use of Blockchains within 
finance. 
In October 2016, the world’s first Blockchain centric Health conference was held where 
leaders from around the world gathered to explore how Blockchain could possibly 
transform their industry. The conference has continued to run yearly, bringing together 
the brightest minds to reimagine how Blockchain will streamline everything from 
payments, medical records, processing and analytics (Distributed Health, 2016). 
In addition to finance and Health Care, Blockchain has gained popularity in the realm 
of digital identities (Marais, Windley, & Smolenski, 2018). For a long time, identity 
management has been a centralised process often controlled by government.  With 
the emergence of self-sovereign digital identities, Blockchain has introduced a trust 
model that many believe can surpass the capabilities of paper-based identity 
management. 
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3.2.2. Online Identity  
Online identity has traditionally been viewed through the lens of an organisation, 
therefore it is not surprising that the focus has been on the organisational needs and 
not needs of the individual (Swan, 2015).  Organisations become identity providers 
(IDPs) by providing individuals with “identifier” data, unique attributes used to access 
their system (McWaters, 2016). The result of this is that people end up with hundreds 
of online identities from different organisations, and the identities are lawfully owned 
by the proprietors of the organisations (Swan, 2015). This problem has consequently 
led to the concept of self-sovereign identities, which can now be achieved using 
Blockchain.  For the first time in history, in as much as Blockchain affords, the 
possibility of individuals owning their identity is achievable. These and other common 
business cases are discussed in forthcoming sections.   
3.2.3. Digital Evolution 
It is important to understand the context of humanity’s digital evolution to appreciate 
and understand how blockchain can have an impact on the world.  
Blockchain has unlocked a new era of digital evolution (Lewis, 2016) that transforms 
the internet of information to the internet of value (Maverick, 2017). This era is powered 
by a combination of mathematics, cryptography, software engineering and behavioural 
economics (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). The technology promises to introduce new 
business models and disrupt industries (Swan, 2015) because it challenges how 
societies have been structured, how participation has been rewarded and how value 
has been defined (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). All of this contributes to the continuous 
advancements of IT in all human endeavours.  
3.2.4. The Categories of Blockchain 
The disruptive technology can be grouped into three categories: identified as 
Blockchain 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0 (Swan, 2015). An example of Blockchain 1.0 is currency; 
applications that leverage off Blockchain in relation to cash; the transfer or currency; 
remittances and payment systems. Blockchain 2.0 is the establishment of contracts; 
the entire slate of financial, economic applications using Blockchain for extensive 
transactions i.e.  stocks, bonds, loans, mortgages, titles, property. Blockchain 3.0 
refers to applications in the areas of government, health, science, culture and art. 
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These advancements of the technology are gradually causing a shift computing 
paradigm in the world (Swan,2015). 
3.2.5. The Fifth Disruptive Computing Paradigm 
The history of computing paradigms consists of innovations such as main frame; 
personal computing; the internet; mobile; social networking and cloud computing. 
These paradigm shifts have ultimately led to the connected world we live in today. 
Computing that relies on Blockchain cryptography can be considered as the most 
current emerging paradigm because, like the internet, it has changed the way 
individuals and organisations approach problems (Swan, 2015). From selecting 
appropriate IT infrastructures, to establishing distributed networks, understanding cost 
implications and regulation of data transferred on Blockchains (Tapscott & Tapscott, 
2017). Blockchain conveniently fits into the connected world of multidevice computing, 
but it brings with its possibilities that motivate diverse approaches to problem solving 
(Swan,2015). Given the widespread global network effect, Blockchain could be 
adopted much quicker than the internet was (Swan, 2015).  
3.3. Blockchain 1.0 
Essentially Blockchain 1.0 is currency, originally it began as Bitcoin. This initial version 
of Blockchain encompasses the deployment of cryptocurrencies in applications related 
to cash, such as money transfer, remittance, and digital payment systems (Swan, 
2015). 
The three layers of Bitcoin are the general structure for cryptocurrencies: Blockchain, 
protocol and the currency. Figure 3.1 illustrates the layers of Bitcoin in relation to the 
Internet Protocol (Syme & Goldie, 2004). These layers are described as follows: 
• The application Layer – ensures effective and direct interaction with the end 
user. 
• The application protocol Layer – defines how application processes that run on 
different end systems pass messages to each other. 
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• General Protocol Layer – Also known as the Transport Layer, provide host-to-
host communication services for applications. 
Traditionally, an exchange of digital money would require that a trusted third party 
keeps a ledger containing all transactions and ensures that transactions had occurred 
only once (Swan, 2015). Blockchain solves this third-party problem by combining 
BitTorrent peer-to-peer file sharing with public key cryptography, thereby preventing 
the digital money from being spent more than once. To achieve this, the ownership of 
a coin is confirmed by cryptographic protocols and the mining community. 
3.3.1. Bitcoin Cryptographic Protocols 
The key part of blockchain technology is the way in which cryptographic techniques 
are applied. If one takes the Bitcoin public key cryptography for example; each Bitcoin 
contains a public key that is linked to its current owner (Figure 3.2). 
TCP/IP (Transmission 
Control Protocol/ Internet 
Protocol)
SMTP (Simple Mail 
Transfer Protocol)
Gmail
Bitcoin Blockchain (The 
Cryptographic Ledger)
Bitcoin Protocol
Bitcoin (BTC) 
digital 
currency
Figure 3.1: Layers of Bitcoin in Relation to 
Internet Protocols 
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Figure 3.2: Process flow of a Bitcoin Transaction 
When a transaction takes place the receiver’s public key is attached to the transaction 
and the transaction is signed with the sender’s private key. When this transaction is 
broadcasted on the Bitcoin Blockchain, the network is informed that the new owner 
has become the owner of the public key. The sender’s signature on the transaction 
verifies that the message is authentic. A complete history of all transactions is kept on 
the Blockchain (Lewis, 2016).  
Each block in the series of blocks contains a group of transactions that took place after 
the last transaction in the previous block. To preserve the integrity of the chain, each 
block validates the integrity of the previous block, this goes back as far as the genesis 
block (the original block). The process involves a lot more detail of the functions used 
to authenticate transactions. The above explanation is only a high-level technical 
overview of the transaction process.  
Bitcoin and other alternative coins, known as Altcoins, constitute as Blockchain 1.0 
(Swan,2015) public Blockchains that are always open, distributed (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2017). The protocol requires proof-of-work, an algorithm that is used to 
confirm transactions and produce new blocks to the chain (Tar, 2018). However, 
Blockchain 1.0 is being extended to Blockchain 2.0, which features a more robust 
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functionality of programmable transactions (Swan, 2015). This will be covered in 
section 3.4. 
3.3.2. Regulatory Status of Blockchain 1.0 (Cryptocurrencies) 
Government regulation is perhaps one of the most substantial factors that determines 
whether Blockchain 1.0 will advance into an established financial services industry.  
Globally, various communities and governments amid economic crisis have adopted 
cryptocurrencies as an attempt to combat hyperinflation (Windley, & Smolenski, 2018). 
Some of these nations affected by the cryptocurrency movements include Zimbabwe, 
Greece, Venezuela (Otis, Vivek, Reuters, D’Alfonso, & Langer, 2016). Moreover, 
economically stable countries like Canada and the US have advocated for Blockchain 
1.0 and taken steps to promote cryptocurrencies to create parity for virtual currencies 
(Thomson Reuters, 2017). In 2017, Canada gave the approval to Impak Coin which 
became the first Canadian approved cryptocurrency (Bloomberg, 2017).  
On the other end of the spectrum nations like China, Bangladesh and Bolivia have 
placed complete bans on cryptocurrencies (Thomson Reuters, 2017). Bangladesh 
threatens punitive sanctions on individuals caught with them (Thomson Reuters, 
2017). China outlawed the use of cryptocurrencies in 2017, which resulted in the 
crypto market losing almost 50% of its value (Weese, 2017). 
In South Africa, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) deemed all 
cryptocurrencies taxable and stated that they will be regarded as assets of an 
intangible nature (SARS, 2018). 
3.4. Blockchain 2.0 
Blockchain 2.0 is the next big tier in the development of the Blockchain industry (Swan, 
2015). There are many different categories and considerations of Blockchain 2.0, but 
standards and definitions are continuing to emerge. Whereas Blockchain 1.0 is for the 
transfer of cryptocurrencies, Blockchain 2.0 is for the transfer of assets beyond 
currency, from the creation of a unit value. Much of what is transferred on Blockchain 
includes smart contracts, smart property. This leads to the decentralisation of markets. 
The most prominent form of Blockchain 2.0 is Ethereum. 
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Ethereum introduced the concept of smart contracts, or decentralised autonomous 
organisations (DAOs), which has become a leading topic of discussion in the 
Blockchain industry (Agrawal, Van der Veer, Kirk, & Arnab, 2017).  
Essentially, smart contracts are autonomous programs that are executed when pre-
defined conditions are met. The great advantage of smart contracts is that they are 
impossible to hack, thereby reducing the costs of verifications, arbitration and fraud 
(Swan, 2015). In the same way that Blockchain 1.0 solved the double spend problem, 
Blockchain 2.0 solves the moral hazard problem (Guerra Guerra, 2018). The Moral 
hazard problem is common in financial markets. It is defined as a situation in which an 
individual or group takes a risk knowing they are protected because another party will 
incur the cost (Thompson, 2008). 
3.4.1. Smart contracts 
In 1994, a cryptographer and legal theorist Szabo came up with the concept of self-
executing contracts on a decentralised ledger (Rosic, 2016). In this format, contracts 
could be converted to code and stored on the Blockchain. However, Szabo’s notion of 
smart contracts did not find usage until cryptocurrencies came into play in 2008. Now 
that Blockchain and smart contracts can be used together, it is conceivable to trigger 
payments when a predefined condition of a contract agreement has been reached. 
This also results in automatic feedback on the ledger that includes confirmation of 
goods received or services rendered (Swan, 2015). More so, smart contracts not only 
define the rules and penalties around an agreement but also automatically enforce 
those obligations (Rosic, 2016). Ethereum and Codius are platforms that have 
successfully enabled smart contracts on Blockchain (Crosby et al., 2015).  
3.4.2. Ethereum 
Ethereum is a Turing-complete virtual machine that can run any cryptocurrency, coin 
or script (Swan, 2015). Rather than a universal development platform, Ethereum is an 
underlying infrastructure that can run all Blockchains and protocols (Ethereum, 2016). 
Each node on the Ethereum network runs the Ethereum virtual machine for the 
execution of smart contracts (Meredith, 2015).  
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The Ethereum ecosystem consists of three components namely; Swarm, Whisper and 
Reputation (Ethereum, 2016).  These components serve for file serving, messages 
and vouching of reputation (Swan, 2015) as shown below: 
• Swarm: is as a decentralised file-serving method on the Ethereum network. 
• Whisper: is a peer-to-peer protocol for secret messaging and digital 
cryptography. 
• Reputation: a way to establish reputation and reduce risk between agents in 
trust-less networks. 
Over time, contracts that are executed on platforms like Ethereum could become 
extremely complex and autonomous (Swan, 2015). Although many experimental 
projects have risen from Blockchain 2.0, it may take some years for Blockchain 2.0 
and 3.0 to create real economic impacts (Zhao, Fan, & Yan, 2016). Table 3.1 depicts 
the differences between Blockchain 1.0 and Blockchain 2.0 and the benefits of the 
latter. 
Table 3.1: Differences between Blockchain 1.0 and 2.0 
Blockchain 1.0 Blockchain 2.0 Benefits of Blockchain 2.0 
Bitcoin Blockchain Ethereum, Corda, 
Hyperledger  
Not locked into one vendor 
Simple Transactions Generic Contracts Can lever more complex 
requests 
One Blockchain Multiple Linked 
Blockchains 
Can partition information to 
suit needs 
Public chains Public, Private, 
Consortium, Domain 
specific. 
Solves privacy and regulatory 
requirements 
Proof of Work only Proof of stake, identity etc. Overcomes speed issues and 
computational costs. 
Always Open and 
Distributed 
User choice Can tailor solutions around 
business needs. 
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3.5. Blockchain 3.0 
As demonstrated by Ethereum and Bitcoin, Blockchain technology affords people a 
universal scope and scale that was previously impossible. This is particularly evident 
in the allocation of resources (Swan, 2015). The technology facilitates the automated 
resource allocation for tangible and intangible assets. It also facilitates manners of 
human interaction and paves the way for interaction between humans and machines 
(Lewis, 2016).  
Blockchain 3.0 is expected to improve the capabilities of platforms like Ethereum and 
Bitcoin while overcoming their observed limitations (Narayanan, 2015). At the time of 
writing this chapter, Blockchain 3.0 is mostly a theoretical concept and has not been 
extensively adopted in the global IT infrastructure (Swan, 2015). However, scientist 
and researchers (Kane, 2017; Swan, 2016; Crosby et al., 2015) believe it to be a 
complete diffusion of the technology throughout society, potentially disrupting systems 
of identification and government services (Kane, 2017). Blockchain 3.0 moves into 
fields of justice, the arts, health and education.  
Figure 3.3 displays findings of a study conducted on 200 contemporary Blockchain 
applications at RMIT University (Kane, 2017). This reveals the number of applications 
that fall into the different categories of Blockchain (Kane, 2017). Most applications fall 
into the second category. 
Figure 3.3: Research on Blockchain application types 
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To contemplate how Blockchain might affect disciplines like corporate governance, 
one can explore Blockchain 3.0. A notable project that exhibits the concept of 
Blockchain 3.0 is a project called the Folding@Home Project (Stanford University 
2016).  
This Blockchain application uses computing cycles to simulate protein folding for 
computational drug designs and molecular dynamic problems (Swan, 2015).  This 
project provides a counterparty token, Folding Coin, that runs on the platform and is 
exchangeable to cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and regular fiat currencies (Ross, 2017).  
The Folding Project has turned into a vibrant community of miners that mine for 
medical research rather than to crack algorithmic hashes (Swan, 2015). The efforts of 
miners can contribute to finding cures for cancer and other diseases.  
Without Blockchain technology, researchers must spend hefty amounts on 
supercomputers to execute molecular simulations (Ross, 2017). This project allows 
anyone to download the FoldingCoin framework and run the program on their 
computer. This therefore distributes the work load to a trusted network of individuals 
on the Blockchain.   
A more essential use of Blockchain 3.0 would be to address the excessive energy 
consumption resulting from the mining of coins. Instead of using computing power to 
crunch arbitrary numbers, perhaps the processing power of mining could be applied 
to solve more practical tasks and real-world problems (Swan, 2015). 
3.5.1. Name Coin Project 
Namecoin is one of the first non-currency uses of Blockchain (Swan, 2015). It exhibits 
the concept of Blockchain 3.0 in the form of preventing internet censorship. This coin 
was created to verify domain name registrations (Kalodner, Carlsten, Ellenbogen, 
Bonneau, & Narayanan, 2015). It provides an alternative for the traditional Domain 
Name Servers (DNS) that are central to the internet. The advantages of a 
decentralised DNS are that it is transnational and not controlled by any single entity, 
thereby making it possible for individuals around the world to publish information 
freely.   
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Namecoin was the first Blockchain solution to solve the long-standing problem of 
producing a naming system that is secure, decentralised and meaningful. This 
problem is known as the Zooko’s Triangle, a trilemma of three desirable naming 
properties for participants on a network. Namecoin is an example of Blockchain 3.0 
that highlights the issue of the appropriate administration of transnational public assets 
and presented a solution for managing it (Swan, 2015). Namecoin provides a free 
speech mechanism for domains that might be censored, for instance in countries with 
limited political freedom.  
3.6. Discussion 
Exploring Blockchain in theory only paints half of the bigger picture. It is only in 
connecting the dots that one can begin to understand its global impact. This section 
discusses examples of traditional human and computing activities that are evolving 
with the use of Blockchain. 
All human societies have a trust problem (Danaher, 2015). It is widely understood that 
all human activities, such as running a business, maintaining a relationship or making 
a living requires co-ordination and cooperation with others (Swan, 2015). However, 
there is and always has been the potential to mislead and abuse the trust of co-
operating parties in any agreement. To address this problem of trust, several societies 
have invented intermediaries such as central banks, government, rituals and laws 
(Danaher, 2015).   
The distributed consensus method that Blockchain provides eradicates the need for 
intermediaries entirely (Swan, 2015). This means that societies could ultimately 
become reliant on the technology as a trust mechanism. 
In business, firms are looking for existing platforms that allow them to launch their 
products (Satell, 2016). The emphasis is moving from developing new applications to 
developing platforms, or “protocols” that can be adopted as needed. Currently, there 
are over a thousand Decentralised applications (DApps) running on the Ethereum 
network (Ethereum, 2018).  
Ethereum is an example of a Platforms as a Service (PaaS). Outside of Blockchain, 
PaaS offerings have been commonly released by large enterprises such as Google, 
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Microsoft or Amazon. Blockchain allows individuals and smaller organisations to 
develop their own PaaS. This has a tremendous effect on the power dynamics and 
competition in the IT industry. 
As demonstrated in the example of Folding Project, Blockchain enables any individual 
with a computer and internet access to take part in a transparent large scale and self-
organised group effort. Crowdfunding on Blockchain, ICO’s and collaborative 
computing are drawing immense attention as they provide transparent and secure 
ways of collective contribution. The system is protected against hacking attacks and 
fraud because there is no central point which can be exploited. 
3.7. Conclusion 
This literature review has highlighted the possibilities of Blockchain by exploring its 
history, the different versions and how each version has been and can be applied in 
modern societies. Since this industry is relatively new, further research will inevitably 
emerge. The review has demonstrated how cryptocurrencies are affecting technology, 
finance and banking in an unprecedented way. This was highlighted in the emergence 
of smart contracts and how they are beginning to reshape our understanding of trust 
and exchange. This chapter then looked at Blockchain 3.0 and how it could provide 
justice applications that go beyond currency, economics and markets.  
The process of organizing any form of activity through a distributed network can 
reinvent many categories of human endeavours, be it in politics, economy, health-care 
or science. Blockchain is proving to be the fifth disruptive computing paradigm shift 
(Swan, 2015).  
The purpose of this chapter was to discuss and explain Blockchain and its use cases.  
This provides the high-level context and background required to understand and 
appreciate the chapters that will follow. 
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4. Chapter 4 – Research Methodology and Design 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter explores research methodologies, philosophies, approaches, 
assumptions and techniques. All of these elements are used to derive the hypothesis 
that Blockchain technology may lead to the disruption of conventional ITG 
processes. 
4.1.1. Background 
Many scholars have described research design as a systematic study performed to 
gain new insight or knowledge on a given subject matter  (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2009). Research designs often need to undergo multiple alterations as the 
study progresses and insights deepen. As a result, researchers end up with designs 
that are unique and an extension of their own methodological strategies (Singh & 
Nayak, 2015). 
In many cases, there is little attention paid to an important dimension of research, the 
methodology. The result of an unfitting methodology can be endless word spinning 
and quotations. The significance of research lies in its quality and not quantity (Pandey 
& Pandey, 2015). 
It is therefore important to exhaust the research planning to conduct the research 
efficiently and reap valuable insight.  
4.1.2. Chapter Layout 
The first section introduces the research design framework from which this design is 
guided, the framework known as the research onion. The next section probes 
qualitative and quantitative research methods. The third section explores research 
philosophies and highlights the selected research design. The research approaches 
and strategies are examined and selected. The fifth section briefly discusses time 
horizons and indicates the selected one. The last section focuses on data collection 
techniques and analysis. 
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4.2. The Research Onion 
The research approach for the dissertation follows the Research Onion progressive 
framework (Figure 4.1) that was developed by Saunders (2007). Each layer in this 
figure represents stages of a research process. It provides an effective way of 
designing and progressing through a research methodology. This is done from the 
outer layers and moves into the inner layers, like peeling an onion, hence the name 
research onion.  
 
Figure 4.1: The Research Onion.  Saunders (2009) 
 
4.3. Research Methods 
Research methods are categorised by the purpose and nature of the study. Research 
methods can be broadly divided into two, namely quantitative and qualitative 
categories (Dudovskiy, 2011). This section will describe these two research methods. 
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4.3.1. Quantitative Research 
In quantitative research, the emphasis is placed on the collection of numerical or 
quantifiable data that verifiably substantiates a theory (Pandey & Pandey, 2015). In 
this research method, objective measurements and statistical analysis of data is done 
through techniques like questionnaires, polls or by using existing statistical data 
(LeCompte & Schensul, 1999). The focus of this method of research is to gather 
quantifiable numerical data and generalise it to explain a phenomenon. 
The goal of quantitative research is to determine the relationships between an 
independent variable and a dependent variable (Babbie, 2018) within a population. 
Quantitative research designs can be experimental or descriptive. Experimental 
studies deal with causality. This involves measuring subjects prior and post an 
experiment. Descriptive studies establish the associations between different variables. 
The main goal in quantitative research is to classify features, count them and develop 
verifiable models then logically explain what is observed (Babbie, 2018). 
4.3.2. Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is characterised by its aims to understand some aspect of social 
life (Patton & Cochran, A Guide to Using Qualitative Research Methodology, 2002). 
Qualitative research methods are more concerned with gaining insights with an 
emphasis on underlying reasons and motivations (Dudovskiy, 2011). Many scholars 
have argued that, qualitative research is best used on topics or situations where there 
is minimal quantitative data available (Patton, & Cochran, 2002; Dudovskiy, 2011; 
Singh, 2011). The objective is to understand the experiences and attitudes of research 
subjects. 
Qualitative methods come with the acknowledgement of abstraction and 
generalisation (Dudovskiy, 2011). Waller and Polonsky (2011) group the appropriate 
data collection methods for qualitative research by vision, forms, images, spoken and 
written word and recorded sound. 
It is important to understand the qualitative methods provide rich data about lived 
experiences and observable environments. This allows researchers to understand 
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behaviours, abstract notions and get a wider context of their research topic 
(Dudovskiy, 2011).  
Despite providing in-depth understanding, qualitative research has been criticised for 
lacking objectivity, reliability or decisiveness. However, it also facilitates 
conceptualisation that is often required for complex disciplines and social studies. 
Numerous studies have suggested that in some areas like concept development, idea 
evaluation, portfolio planning and strategy and policy-making, qualitative research is 
the prime source of research (Cooper & Patterson, 2013). 
Popular qualitative data collection methods used in business studies 
include interviews, focus groups, observation and action research (Dudovskiy, 2011).   
Although many qualitative studies have been regarded as non-scientific, its methods 
are still a respectable science because it involves systemic protocols that should be 
followed to support sound arguments (Singh & Nayak, 2015). In qualitative research, 
it is important to show context, credibility and intellectual integrity, these are described 
below:  
I. Context 
A cardinal principle of a research approach is to keep the hypothesis in context. This 
is due to the fact that results, methods and conclusions are dependent on context 
(Singh & Nayak, 2015). Therefore, it is significant that the context is carefully 
referenced (Creswell, 1997). This can be done by providing detailed background 
information, such as the types of people involved in the research, the time period, 
environment and the reasons why the data collected is applicable to the theory.  
II. Credibility 
Credibility is defined as the confidence that can be placed in the truth of the research 
findings (Holloway & Wheeler, 2002; Macnee & McCabe, 2008). Credibility proves that 
research findings embody plausible information drawn from the participants’ original 
data and is a correct interpretation of the participants’ original views (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985; Graneheim & Lundman, 2004). 
To strengthen credibility, it is essential that qualitative research includes information 
about the researcher that could lead to interpretive bias or affect data collection or 
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analysis of the research. For example, information relating to personal connections 
that the researcher has with participants, the topic or situation and context (Cooper & 
Patterson, 2013). The researcher should maintain consistency as they analyse the 
information collected. When a researcher returns to the data collected, they should 
ensure that the themes, constructs and interpretations make sense and reflect the 
nature of the phenomenon (Emma Eccles Jones Research Center, 2018). 
Credibility requires the researcher to perform the following three activities: 
i. Prolonged engagement 
To become familiar with the topic the researcher must spend sufficient time on 
the topic and explore and understand all aspects of the context in order to 
properly identify factors that influence the phenomenon. Prolonged 
engagement is also necessary to build rapport with participants in the 
research.  
ii. Persistent observation  
The researcher needs to be able to recognise and focus on relevant 
characteristics of the context of study. Observation should be continuous until 
the researcher reaches a point of saturation to retrieve as much authentic data 
as possible.  
iii. Triangulation 
Triangulation is a research strategy for reducing systematic bias (Emma Eccles 
Jones Research Center, 2018). It refers to the use of multiple diverse data 
sources to develop a comprehensive understanding of phenomena (Patton, 
Enhancing the quality and credibility of qualitative analysis, 1999). The process 
of triangulation ensures that the research is an unbiased and consists of 
multiple examples and sources of information. Denzin (1978) and Patton (1999) 
identified four types of triangulation: (a) method triangulation, (b) investigator 
triangulation, (c) theory triangulation, and (d) data source triangulation (Carter 
et al., 2014). 
  
Chapter 4 – Research Methodology and Design 
43 
 
 
III. Intellectual Integrity  
To maintain intellectual integrity, it is vital to search for opposing cases or evidence 
that contradicts patterns of the general research findings (Emma Eccles Jones 
Research Center, 2018). This can be done by including alternative explanations or 
reasoning for opposing data. To challenge biases, a research can document their 
perspective and allow sceptical and critical thinking to consider other perspectives. 
Additionally, following up with participants may be necessary for clarifications down 
the line (Dudovskiy, 2011). The key factor in maintaining intellectual integrity is to be 
educated on the different research approaches. This ensures the researcher can make 
informed decisions and design a more rigorous study.  
4.4. Research Philosophy 
Research philosophy is the basic belief system or world view that guides an 
investigation (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). The term philosophy in research refers to the 
development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge (Datt, 2016). 
The philosophy behind academic research reveals the source, nature and 
development of knowledge. This development of knowledge is formed from 
assumptions made from one’s perspective of the world (Gialdino, 2009). Based on 
different perspectives, strategies and methods for different research will always differ 
(Creswell, 1997). 
To substantiate the way data in this research will be elicited, gathered and analysed, 
three different belief paradigms are explored, namely:  ontology, axiology and 
epistemology. Each of these ways of thinking influence the way one thinks about a 
research process. The purpose of highlighting these thinking preferences is not to 
argue which is the best approach but to understand one approach in relation to another 
and to determine how the selected one is most suitable for this research. 
4.4.1. Ontology 
The ontological philosophy is concerned with that which constitutes reality. It focuses 
on objective questions that relate to matters that exist in the real world. Matters that 
fall outside of this realm, for example moral significance and aesthetics are deemed 
insignificant (Kothari, 2004).  
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In the context of Blockchain technology, ontology would treat the questions of 
existence. For example; what is Blockchain technology? How is it being characterised, 
created, and implemented? In a practical point of view, it would provide a concise 
definition of the technology (Swan & De Filippi, Toward a Philosophy on Blockchain: 
A Symposium, 2017).  
4.4.2. Axiology 
Axiology is concerned with the assessment of the researcher’s values in all phases of 
the research (Swan & De Filippi, Toward a Philosophy on Blockchain: A Symposium, 
2017). This philosophy primarily focuses on two aspects - subjectivism and 
objectivism. Subjectivism embraces that social phenomena are formed based on the 
perceptions and actions of the social actors involved. Objectivism portrays that social 
entities exist outside of social actors involved.  In the context of Blockchain, an axiology 
philosophy would focus on how Blockchain technology is valorised, taken up, and 
regarded by individuals and society (Swan & De Filippi, Toward a Philosophy on 
Blockchain: A Symposium, 2017).  
4.4.3. Epistemology  
The term epistemology refers to what is known to be true, as opposed to doxology; 
what is believed to be true (Singh & Nayak, 2015). The assumptions in epistemology 
are concerned with how knowledge can be formed, disseminated and communicated 
(Datt, 2016). It focuses on what is means to know. Epistemology asks the question, 
what is the nature of the relationship between the researcher and what can be known 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1994).  
In the context of Blockchain technology, an epistemological approach would ask what 
new kinds of things Blockchain technology is helping us to know or understand (Swan 
& De Filippi, Toward a Philosophy on Blockchain: A Symposium, 2017). 
With regards to new knowledge and new ways of knowing, the researcher could ask 
about the corresponding standards of proof, or truth, that supports this new 
knowledge. For example, is there new knowledge that is required to create and 
engage with Blockchain technology (Swan & De Filippi, Toward a Philosophy on 
Blockchain: A Symposium, 2017). 
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Based on the main objectives of this dissertation, the selected philosophy is 
epistemology. The problem statement is to identify how principles of Blockchain 
technology may affect ITG disciplines and to highlight how the scope of governance 
frameworks have limitations. Epistemology is most suitable for this research because 
it addresses questions such as: 
• What is knowledge?  For the purposes of this study, what is ITG? 
• How is this knowledge acquired? – This can be ascertained by interviewing 
subject matter experts. 
• What do people know? – How much of what exists in ITG frameworks include 
the concept of distributed ledgers and decentralised business models? 
• How do we know what we know? – How can we make informed decisions using 
governance frameworks that do not include concepts of DLTs1 , DApps2 and 
market decentralisation? How can we measure good ITG in the context of 
today’s disruptive technologies? 
The assumptions based on each of the above-mentioned philosophies can be 
fragmented and guided by different elements. Three major intrinsic elements of 
epistemology are positivism, interpretivism and realism. These are described below: 
I. Positivism 
The principle of positivism supports working with observable social reality. The product 
of positivism is often law-like generalisations like those produced by physical and 
natural scientists (Remenyi, 2008). Positivism requires that a research makes use of 
existing theories to develop a hypothesis. The hypothesis is then tested and confirmed 
which may lead to further progress of the theory. The driving notion of positivism is 
that only observable phenomena will lead to the production of credible data. 
II. Interpretivism  
Interpretivism advocates the understanding of differences or similarities between 
humans in their roles as social actors (Singh & Nayak, 2015). Contrasting positivism, 
                                            
1 Distributed Ledger Technology 
2 Decentralised Applications 
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this principle negates that rich insights into complex problems can be formed solely 
from law like generalisations (Saunders et al., 2009). The notion of interpretivism is 
based on how one interprets social roles in accordance with the meaning one gives to 
these roles. Additionally, the roles may be interpreted in accordance with a subjective 
frame of reference (Datt, 2016). 
Often a qualitative approach is applied that promotes interaction with individuals in 
order to collaboratively construct a meaningful reality (Rowlands, 2005). 
III. Realism 
Realism refers to scientific inquiry emphasising on the reality projected by one’s sense 
as truth (Datt, 2016). This philosophy depends on the idea of independence of reality 
from the human mind, it can be divided into two groups; direct and critical realism.  
Direct realism is the belief that what one observes and perceives through one’s human 
senses is real (Gram, 1983). In contrast, critical realism is the belief that what one 
observes are only images of objects and not the actual objects.  
IV. Pragmatism 
The philosophy of pragmatism accepts ideas if they support actions. The concept 
recognises that there are a multitude of ways to interpret and understand the world 
and that no single view can summarise the entire picture. Pragmatism supports 
multiple realities and denotes that research questions are the most significant factor 
of the philosophy. Table 4.1 highlights the selected approach for this research.   
Table 4.1: Data collection Methods for Philosophical Principles 
 Interpretivism Pragmatism Realism Positivism 
Description Interpret social 
roles in 
accordance 
with unique 
frames of 
reference. 
Accepts ideas 
to be 
substantial 
only if they 
support 
actions. 
Scientific 
inquiry 
focused on 
projected 
reality. 
Includes two 
groups:  
Working with 
observable 
social reality. 
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Direct 
realism  
Critical 
realism.  
Common 
Methodologies 
Mixed or 
multiple 
method 
designs, 
quantitative 
and qualitative 
Highly 
structured, 
large samples, 
Measurement, 
quantitative, 
but can use 
qualitative 
Methods 
chosen must 
fit the 
subject 
matter, 
quantitative 
or 
qualitative. 
Small samples, 
in-depth 
investigations, 
qualitative 
The selected philosophical method for this research is interpretivism. The study 
interprets the role of IT Directors in DAOs in accordance with the COBIT’s Enterprise 
ITG guidelines.  
4.5. Research Approach 
The research approach is a plan that consists of steps and procedures to complete 
the research (Dudovskiy, 2011). These procedures span from broad assumptions to 
detailed methods of data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Creswell, 2012). 
Deductive Approach 
Deductive reasoning is one of the two basic types of logical inference (Johnson-Laird, 
2009). Researchers practise deduction when making connections from a premise to a 
conclusion.  
According to Goldstein (2007), the Greek philosopher Aristotle was considered to be 
the father of deductive reasoning, who simplified it into the following classic example: 
• All men are mortal. 
• Socrates is a man. 
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• Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
The premise established in this example is that Socrates is a member of a group of 
individuals whom are all mortal. The apparent conclusion is that Socrates must be 
mortal.  
In deductive research, the objective is to test concepts from existing theories by using 
new empirical data. This approach is known as theory-testing (Singh & Nayak, 2015) 
or top-down logic (Soiferman, 2010). Nevertheless, the goal of deductive research is 
not always to test a theory, this approach can be used to expand on or improve an 
existing theory (Datt, 2016). Deductive is most suitable when there are existing 
competing theories on a phenomenon and research examine the best theories under 
certain circumstance.  
Studies that use deduction as an approach follow the following sequential steps 
(Robson, 2002): 
i. Deducing hypothesis: this first step involves creating a proposition that can be 
tested. The proposition involves the relationship between two or more concepts.  
ii. Formulating a hypothesis in operational terms: Indicating how concepts or 
variables are to be measured. 
iii. Testing hypothesis. 
iv. Examining the outcome of the theory and inquiry. 
v. Modifying the theory: If necessary, this step involves adjusting the theory in light 
of the research finding.  
Once these steps have been followed, it is essential to verify the revised theory by 
restarting or repeating the cycle.  
The risk of deductive approach is syllogism, an instance of a form of reasoning where 
a conclusion is drawn from two premises. Both premises can include a common term 
but is not the conclusion. 
Deductive arguments are not referred to as true or false, but rather as sound or 
unsound.  In a sound argument, the premise guarantees the conclusions, in contracts 
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and unsound argument, the premise does not guarantee the conclusion. This means 
that a deduction can be true and unsound or sound and untrue.  
The advantage of deductive reasoning is that there is a possibility to explain casual 
relationships between concepts and variables (Dudovskiy, 2011). 
4.5.2. Inductive Approach 
In inductive research, the objective is to infer theories and patterns from observable 
data. This approach is known as theory-building (Singh & Nayak, 2015). 
To successfully examine the impact of a modern technology, an inductive approach is 
the best approach because it focuses on building a theory where there are few prior 
theories or explanations of this subject matter. However deductive reasoning will be 
applied to aspects of the research that have already been conceptualised and written 
in theory, such as ITG processes. 
Inductive and deductive approaches go hand in hand when building a theoretical 
model (Singh & Nayak, 2015), therefore researchers should be able to go back and 
forth on inductive and deductive reasoning if they are aiming to improve or modify an 
existing theory or develop an enhanced one.  
Inductive reasoning begins with detailed observations of the world (Figure 4.2), this 
then moves towards more abstract generalisations and concepts (Dudovskiy, 2011). 
Unlike deductive reasoning, induction does not use syllogisms, but a series of 
observations, in order to reach a conclusion. The observations begin with a general 
principle, then a chain of evidence is added and combined with previous observations.  
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Figure 4.2: Inductive Reasoning Process 
It must be noted that inductive research disregards existing theories when forming 
research questions or ideas. Induction aims to create meaning from data collected as 
a way to identify patterns and relationships to build a theory (Datt, 2016). This 
approach is based on learning from experience. Therefore patterns, standards and 
common premises are observed to reach a conclusion.   
When following an inductive approach, the researcher begins with a topic and builds 
an empirical generalisation and finds relationships in the process (Kothari, 2004) . In 
the initial stage, if no hypothesis can be found, this means the researcher will confirm 
their proposed theory based on their findings when the study is complete.  
One of the risks of inductive research is hasty generalisations (Pandey & Pandey, 
2015). Fallacies can occur when researchers commit an early inductive leap or make 
an induction that is not based on sufficient evidence to substantiate a claim.  
The correctness of theories for inductive reasoning is more flexible than deduction 
(Soiferman, 2010). An argument based on inductive research is deemed correct when 
the premise provides legitimate evidence or supports the truth of the conclusion (Singh 
& Nayak, 2015). However, it should be noted that no inductive argument is absolutely 
perfect or entirely impractical, although some may be relatively better or worse than 
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others because they propose a more probable conclusion. In every case, relevant 
information strengthens the reliability of an inductive argument (Datt, 2016). 
Inductive research often deals with unique contexts in which events take place 
(Creswell, 1997). Therefore, the research can be conducted from a small sample of 
subjects as opposed to a substantial number, as with the deductive approach (Singh 
& Nayak, 2015). 
Another important characteristic of inductive research is that it is most appropriate for 
studies that have a shortage of literature to develop a hypothesis. There seems to be 
a dearth in scholarly literature on existing frameworks or theories on the impact of 
Blockchain technology on ITG. Therefore, an inductive approach is best suited for this 
study. Table 4.2 summarises the difference between inductive and deductive and 
shows the one selected. 
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Table 4.2: Differences between Inductive and Deductive Approaches 
Deductive Inductive 
Begins with scientific principles Focus is on understanding meaning  
Converting theory to quantifiable data A close understanding of the 
research context 
Focuses on causality between different 
variables. 
Focuses on relationships between 
variables 
Mostly uses quantitative data. Mostly uses qualitative data 
Uses control measures to validate data Requires Credibility and context to 
create correctness. 
Approach is highly structured  Structure is flexible to permit 
changes of research emphasis 
The research must employ objectivity Researcher is part of the research 
process, which may lead to 
subjectivity. 
A sample of sufficient size is required in 
order to form generalizations. 
No need to generalise 
 
4.6. Research Strategies 
It must be emphasised that no single strategy is more superior to the other. The 
importance lies in being able to address a problem statement or answer a particular 
research question to meet the objectives of the overall study.   
The research questions, objectives, existing knowledge, time and other available 
resources and the philosophical underpinnings should guide the selected research 
strategy (Saunders et al., 2009). However, these strategies ought not to be considered 
as being mutually exclusive. The strategies that are discussed in this section are; 
survey; case study; grounded theory; ethnography and archival research. 
4.6.1. Survey 
Survey research is defined as the collection of information from a sample of individuals 
through their responses to questions (Check & Schutt, 2012). It is a well-known and 
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common system in business and management research (Dudovskiy, 2011) and is 
oftentimes used to answer who, what, where, how much and what number of inquiries. 
It consequently tends to be used for exploratory and descriptive research (Chambliss 
& Schutt, 2014). 
The essence of surveying is to question individuals on topics and describe their 
answers (Dudovskiy, 2011). Surveys can be used as the primary data collection 
method to test concepts, reflect attitudes and opinions of participants or to conduct 
market research. Surveys can be used both in quantitative and qualitative studies. Its 
two main purposes are to describe characteristics of the population or test a 
hypothesis (Dudovskiy, 2011). 
The data collected from participants during a survey can be used to formulate 
hypotheses or validate an existing one (Singh & Nayak, 2015). It can highlight 
relationships between variables. The survey method gives researchers more control 
over the examination procedure and, and sampling allows for a lower cost data 
collection of an entire population.  
4.6.2. Case study 
A case study is a strategy that involves empirical investigation of a particular 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context using multiple sources of 
evidence (Robson, 2002). The boundaries between phenomena are not always clear, 
thus it is important to provide context (Yin, 2003).  
This is vastly different from the experimental strategy that was described before, where 
the research is conducted inside a controlled setting. Case studies also differ from 
survey strategy where, even though research has context, the ability to explore and 
understand the context is restricted to the number of variables for which data can be 
collected (Saunders et al., 2009). 
The use of case studies is particularly useful to deeply grasp the context of a research 
topic (Morris & Wood, 1991). This strategy can lead to answers of questions of why 
and what, which makes it a common selection for explanatory and exploratory 
research.  
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Case studies can be categorised into four groups and are based on discreet 
dimensions (Yin 2003). These include single case vs multiple case, and holistic case 
vs embedded case. A single case can be used to showcase a critical, extreme, unique 
cases or typical cases. Case studies can include multiple cases if there is a need to 
establish a correlation between the different cases. Holistic vs embedded case studies 
refer to the unit of analysis (Saunders et al., 2009). If for instance, the research is 
focused on an entire organisation, it would be considered a holistic case study. If a 
segment or portion of a larger context is studied and incorporated in the research, it is 
considered as an embedded case study.  
4.6.3. Grounded Theory 
The strategy of grounded theory is often used for inductive approaches, although 
conclusions can be regarded as too simplistic (Saunders et al., 2009). Grounded 
theory can be considered as theory building that uses both inductive and deductive 
approaches. According to Goulding (2002), Grounded Theory is ideal for research that 
aims to predict or explain behaviours or phenomena. It was developed to allow new, 
contextualised theories to emerge directly from data. 
Data collection in grounded theory starts with forming a theoretical framework and 
collecting data from observations.  Predictions are formed based on the data collected 
and these predictions are confirmed using additional observations. The continuous 
reference to data is why this strategy can be seen as an inductive and not a deductive 
approach (Collis and Hussey 2003).  
It is important to note that grounded theory should not be used to ignore existing 
literature. Furthermore, grounded theory does not represent raw data and data 
collected is conceptual and used to draw conclusions and insights.  
4.6.4. Ethnography 
Ethnography is the study of social interactions, behaviours, and perceptions that occur 
within groups, teams, organisations, and communities (Reeves & Hodges, 2008). 
Ethnography emanates from the field of anthropology (Saunders et al., 2009) and is 
deeply rooted in inductive approaches. The objective of this strategy is to explain the 
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social world. Most times ethnographic strategies involve extended participants in 
observation and is considered as a naturalistic approach to collecting data. 
Ethnography is not particularly dominant in business studies (Saunders et al., 2009) 
but it may be useful to gain insights of a certain context or to interpret theories from 
the perspectives of parties involved.  
4.6.5. Archival Research 
The final strategy as outlined by Saunders (2009) is archival research. This strategy 
makes use of document and data records as a primary source of data. Archival can 
refer to recent and historical documents although it is not to be confuse with secondary 
data analysis (Bryman, 1989). Data used in archival research is key to the study 
because it is a product of the day-today activities (Hakim, 2000).  
Research questions in archive studies can change from exploratory to descriptive to 
explanatory mainly because the focus can shift from the past to present. However, the 
ability to find conclusions may be inhibited by the nature of the records and archives. 
A disadvantage to this strategy is that data can be missing or access to data can be 
denied which makes is difficult to answer all research questions. Therefore, it is 
necessary to design the research to make the most of available archival data. 
This research employs two main research strategies, namely: a case study and a 
survey (questionnaire). These are most appropriate to establish the impact of 
Blockchain on ITG for the following reasons: 
1. A case study is conducive to this research because it allows the researcher to 
focus on a single entity and examine variables in context. This case study 
directs the research on a prime example of a Blockchain organisation, 
Ethereum. The case study: a) investigates how members of this organisation 
cooperate, b) explores the structures in place to keep this autonomous system 
running and c) investigates how the organisation is governed in terms of 
enterprise IT. 
2. Since case studies are targeted and niche specific, it allows for rich quality data 
to emerge. In the context of Blockchain and its continuous development, it is 
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more useful to examine an existing organisation such as an Ethereum based 
platform to study the social proof and implications of the technology on 
governance principles. 
3. A questionnaire allows the researcher to source primary data from subject 
matter experts. This data will be synthesised and analysed in order explore 
common themes and patterns that will form the final hypothesis. 
4.7. Time Horizon 
The timing aspect of research is a key element in the entire process. It is vital to plan 
research in accordance with a time objective. For instance, if research is designed to 
capture a snapshot of a particular time, it is necessary to account for that as part of 
the research design. Saunders (2009) proposes two types of time horizons to consider 
when formulating a research design. They are cross-sectional and longitudinal.  
4.7.1. Cross-Sectional 
A cross sectional time horizon is best used for studies that focus on particular 
phenomena at a particular time (Saunders et al., 2009). This is often due to time 
constraints held by academic institutions. Cross-section studies mostly see to describe 
incidence of phenomena at a certain time period or they may explain how independent 
variables within different organisations are related.  
4.7.2. Longitudinal Study 
Much like cross-sectional research, longitudinal study can be observational; however, 
researchers perform observations repeatedly over a longer period of time. Longitudinal 
studies can span over years because the objective is not constrained by time. The 
advantages of longitudinal research are they establish a sequence of events and 
research can easily detect changes in variables or population characteristics.   
The most appropriate time horizon for this research is cross-sectional. 
The decision between cross-sectional or longitudinal time horizons is informed on the 
basis of the rapidly evolving technology as the research topic. Due to the fact that 
Blockchain developments and adoption is rising at an exponential rate, a deliberate 
attempt to address the problem statement in a fixed time period will reveal relevant 
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findings. This is imperative in order to avoid any scope creep that may occur on the 
overall research. Having said this, longitudinal approach could be applied to this study 
to monitor the sequence of developments on ITG frameworks over time. However, the 
problem statement is based on current state of governance frameworks, therefore the 
selected time horizon for this study is cross-sectional.  
4.8. Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection is the process of collection of information from relevant sources to 
answer research questions, test a hypothesis and evaluate an outcome (Dudovskiy, 
2011). The techniques of collection data can be divided into two types i.e. primary and 
secondary methods.  
4.8.1. Secondary Data Collection Techniques 
Secondary data is data that has already been published in journals, reports, books 
etc. (Vartanian, 2011). Resources are widely available and can be used to support a 
hypothesis. Selecting secondary data should be done with a clear set of criteria as this 
creates reliability and credibility.  
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4.8.2. Primary Data Collection Techniques 
Primary data collection can fall into two groups, quantitative and qualitative (Datt, 
2016). Figure 4.3 illustrates the breakdown of common data collection techniques in 
primary research grouped by quantitative and qualitative data (Saunders et al., 2009).  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques 
 
4.8.3. Qualitative data collection 
I. Interviews 
Interviews are the most common type of data collection techniques for qualitative 
research. Unlike the quantitative type, qualitative interviews make use of open-ended 
questions and have a conversational format. The interviewer can ask the same set of 
questions to participants but can change the order, wording and can choose to use 
follow up questions to clarify the meaning of the questions or answers given. 
Primary Research
Quantitative 
Data
Surveys
Personal Interviews
Mail
Self adminsitrered 
Surverys
Telephone
Expirements
Mechanical 
Observation
Simulation
Qualitative Data
Focus Groups
Questionnaire/Interviews
Observation
Case Study
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II. Questionnaires  
Qualitative questionnaires attempt to elicit more in-depth responses. Surveys that are 
carried out during a certain period of time are known to have a cross-sectional design 
(Mathers & Hunn, 2009). They provide a snapshot of the thoughts or activity during at 
that particular time and often take descriptive or exploratory form. Questionnaires that 
are based on an epistemological approach aim to understand the conditions of truth, 
belief or justification (Ichikawa & Steup, 2017). 
III. Focus Groups 
Focus groups employ the use of interviews with a small group of people. This 
technique allows the researcher to efficiently gather a general consensus of opinions 
in on session (Singh & Nayak, 2015). The focus group often includes homogenous 
groups of people, for example: a group of students, group of IT directors, group of 
athletes etc (Singh & Nayak, 2015).  
4.9. Data Analysis Techniques  
Data analysis is the process of reducing data to a story and interpretation (LeCompte 
& Schensul, 1999). Data analysis for qualitative studies differ to that of quantitative 
studies, however comparisons of data collected to existing data is critically important 
for both approaches (Dudovskiy, 2011). Quantitative data uses descriptive and 
inferential numerical analysis, while qualitative analysis employs the use of 
description, thematic or image analysis (Creswell, 1997).   
4.9.1. Qualitative data analysis  
Given that this research takes on a qualitative approach, it is inevitable that the 
answers to research questions will be encapsulated in words and not figures. The 
amount of words generated in questionnaires will be summarised. This requires the 
researcher to highlight the relationships between variables and themes. Additionally, 
the research may have to relate the ideas or behaviour of interview participants to their 
biographical characteristics. A theory can then be developed using advanced testing 
and analysis (Lacey & Luff, 2009). 
To analyse qualitative data, some or all of following processes are required (Lacey & 
Luff, 2009): 
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o Reviewing, reading and listening to familiarise oneself with the data; 
o Transcription of audio recorded content; 
o Organising and indexing data for easy identification and access; 
o Anonymity with regards to sensitive data; 
o Indexing (or coding); 
o Identification of themes and patterns; 
o Re-coding; 
o Developing provisional categories; 
o Exploring relationships between categories; 
o Refining themes and categories; 
o Developing a hypothesis and incorporating pre-existing knowledge; 
o Testing the theory against data collected; 
o Writing reports that include excerpts from the original data (e.g. quotes 
from interviews). 
It is not always necessary to go through the processes mentioned above if the 
researcher is simply interested in identifying the correlation of variables or trying to 
address a specific question (Lacey & Luff, 2009). There are three broad ways of 
analysing the data further: 
1. One way could be in simply counting the number of times that a specific 
theme, word or concept has occurred in a narrative. The qualitative data can 
then be subject to statistical analysis. This kind of analysis is not truly 
qualitative. 
2. For a thematic analysis, the research needs to go more in depth. All 
sentence or paragraphs that refer to a common theme can be given a 
particular code and can then be examined in more detail. 
3. For theoretical analysis, such as grounded theory, the researcher may be 
able to test the theory against existing theories or against further analysis of 
data. The researcher may also choose to source contradictory theory to fully 
consider their findings. This process is called “Analytic Induction” and is 
often used to build and test emerging theories. 
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According to Saunders (2009), there is no specific way of analysing diverse data, 
however all qualitative data can be analysed using three processes. The first is to 
summarise concepts, the second is to categorise concepts and the third is to structure 
concepts using a narrative. Furthermore, different strategies can be used for deductive 
and inductive approaches.  
Since qualitative research can either be inductive or deductive. One must select 
analytical techniques that are best suited for the selected style, inductive research. 
The next section focuses on unique ways to analyse inductive data. 
4.9.2. Inductive Approach to Data Analysis 
Inductive coding begins with close readings of text (Thomas D. R., 2006). It is 
important that the research considers ambiguity that can be inherently found in text. 
The research must identify segments and units and then categorise them using labels. 
At some stage the researcher might interpret the meaning of a category and write a 
note about it. The category may also be linked to other categories in various 
relationships, such as a network, a hierarchy of categories, or a causal sequence 
(Thomas D. R., 2006) 
Table 4.3 describes inductive procedures that can be followed to analyse data 
(Thomas D. R., 2006). 
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Table 4.3: Process of Inductive Data Analysis 
Process Description 
Preparation of raw 
data files  
This process involves formatting raw data files into the 
same format. E.g. font, margins, questions, comments 
etc. It is essential to create a backup of raw data for 
each interview. 
Close reading of text Once the data has been formatted, if should be read 
thoroughly so that the researcher is familiar with the 
themes and details in the text. 
Creation of categories Once the content has been read through, the 
researcher must identify and define categories or 
themes. The broader categories are derived from the 
research objectives. And the lower categories are 
derived from various interpretations of the raw data, this 
is called in-vivo coding. 
Overlapping coding 
and non-coded text 
Segments of text can be coded into more than one 
category, and a large some of text can be assigned to a 
different category. It is important to look out for text that 
may not be relevant to the evaluation objectives. 
Continuing revision 
and refinement of 
category system 
The research should look for subtopics and 
contradictory points of view in each category. The 
researcher should also look for appropriate quotes to 
convey the theme and combine linked categories if 
interpretations are similar. 
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4.10. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to explore research methodologies, philosophies, 
approaches, strategies, choices, time horizons as well as data collection techniques. 
These elements form part of what is known as the research onion (Saunders et al., 
2009).  
The proposed research design will focus on gathering existing information in the form 
of literature studies on Blockchain and IT governance as well as performing single 
case study on Ethereum, a popular decentralised autonomous organisation. This data 
will be marked as secondary data. 
The primary data for this research will consist of data collected and analysed from an 
online questionnaire completed by subject matter experts.  
To conclude the outcome of the research design, it must be noted that each choice 
has been deliberately chosen in relation to the research topic. The problem statements 
and research objective as described in chapter one has been carefully considered as 
a guide for the selection of philosophies, approaches and strategies.  
The selected research philosophy for this study is epistemology and thus 
interpretivism will be used to analyse themes and patterns that emerge from as the 
study progresses. The research approach will be inductive to allow for a formulation 
of a new hypothesis. The selected strategies will be an in-depth case study on an 
Ethereum organisation. As such the researcher will employ the use of open-ended 
questionnaire to probe information from the participants. The dominant research 
choice is mono-method qualitative, which will allow for deeper insight and 
understanding of the complex nature of the subject. A cross sectional time horizon will 
be applied to the research in an effort to encapsulate the findings in the context of the 
current Blockchain developments. 
The research can therefore be described as: 
  
Chapter 4 – Research Methodology and Design 
64 
 
 
An empirical qualitative, inductive and cross-sectional study of Blockchain and 
IT governance, which attains data through literature reviews, a questionnaire 
and a case study on Decentralised Autonomous Organisations. It inductively 
analyses primary data from a questionnaire and a holistic case study using 
thematic coding methods from which recommendations are made. 
The research design and methodology are diverse and complementary based on the 
research objective.  
The value of this chapter lies in the meticulous and careful consideration and selection 
of the research design. In addition to that, the chapter specifies why alternative 
methods may not have served this research best and substantiates motives for the 
selected design. 
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5. Chapter 5 – A Case Study of Decentralised 
Autonomous Organisations 
5.1. Introduction 
A DAO is a computer program that runs a distributed peer to peer network (Overy, 
2016). DAOs are created to operate like virtual companies without a central governing 
body. They are controlled by communities of people. The individuals in these 
communities may come and go. DAOs achieve this type of collaborative governance 
by programming organisational processes into code. The code runs on a digital 
platform that is accessible to all parties in the organisation, with the exception of 
organisations with specific confidentiality mandates. 
5.2. Background 
DAOStack is one of the many online DAOs available and it is also an operating system 
for collective intelligence. 
In centralised organisations, the power and decision-making authority is held by 
executive members or top-level management. This creates a hierarchy / decision-
making structure where the top-level employees’ control and direct the organisation.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum are decentralised organisations where the 
process of decision making is delegated. Executives assign parts of their 
responsibilities to management and communicate often to oversee operational 
processes. However, different teams still need to ensure their processes align with the 
main business vision and broader plan (GoCo, 2017). They do, however, make up 
their own rules. No company is 100% centralised or decentralised, instead there are 
varying degrees of both (Drube, 2018). Johnson & Johnson is a well-known example 
of a business with a decentralised structure. It has over 200 units that function 
autonomously. 
A DAO is similar to a decentralised organisation; however, the key difference is that 
DAOs exist as virtual computer networks. DAOs rely on distributed ledger technology 
to record and enforce decisions and organisational processes. This could include 
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aspects like issuing shares, appointing a CEO, voting on proposals, and paying 
salaries (e Inc., 2017) 
The following is a thought experiment on a use case of an autonomous agent (Hearn, 
2017). 
Imagine a self-driving electric car is programmed to cruise around in search for 
passengers. After successfully picking up and dropping off passengers, the car 
decides to head to a charging station to use its profits to recharge its battery. Aside 
from the initial programming, there is no human intervention or control in helping 
determine the car’s mission. 
This idea describes how DAOs could help power leaderless organisations in the future. 
The concept is that if Bitcoin can do away with financial middle men, one day 
organisations can operate without hierarchical governance.  
5.2.1. Responsibilities of IT Directors 
Every organisation is unique and may require different responsibilities from their IT 
directors. This often depends on the size of the organisation and the scope within the 
enterprise. The industry also has an impact on the role of the director. For example, 
government, non-profit, healthcare sectors require IT directors but in different 
contexts. Nevertheless, regardless of the industry, there are broad and common 
responsibilities that all IT directors share (ISACA, 2012).These are listed below: 
• Developing and overseeing Specific, Measurable, Accurate, and 
Reliable and Timely (SMART) metrics for hardware, software, and 
storage. 
• Guaranteeing a strategic capacity plan. 
• Liaising with senior level IT managers, making hiring decisions, 
handling employee performance. 
• Communicating and collaborating with the technology team. 
• Determining business requirements for IT systems. 
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• Coordinating IT activities to ensure the security, privacy and availability 
of data and network services. 
• Managing IT risk to an acceptable level. 
• Overseeing budgets and financial forecasts. 
• Implementing IT related policies from board members and reporting 
back. 
• Identifying and recommending modern technology solutions. 
Before the building blocks of a typical DAO are explained, it is necessary to establish 
how DAOStack transcribes governance practices into executable software protocols. 
This is covered in the next section. 
5.2.2. Agencies in DAOs 
The foundations of DAOs are smart companies or agencies. A smart agency is an 
atomic governance unit that is managed and operated with smart contracts 
(DAOStack, 2018). Agencies should have their own tokens, reputation systems and a 
governance system. The token is associated with the company’s resources, the 
reputation is based on the credibility in company matters and the governance system 
consists of the bylaws that are written and executed in smart contracts. 
The agency can come up with any suitable by-laws to create the governance protocol 
(DAOStack, 2018). An example of one is a proposal-based governance system. This 
allows members of the network to vote whether they agree or disagree to company 
proposals (Jentzsch, 2017). A majority vote is required for approval and execution 
(DAOStack, 2018). The execution is an automated action once approved. Proposals 
could be about shareholding, token distribution, or any other endeavour in the 
company (eInc., 2017). The votes can be weighted by voter reputation or any other 
attribute deemed necessary. Figure 5.1 is a heuristic visualization of what this could 
look like (DAOStack, 2018): 
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In this figure, the solid balls represent agents within the company and the proximity to 
the centre indicates their influence or reputation (the closer they are to the centre, the 
stronger their influence or reputation). The size of the solid balls reflects the quantity 
of tokens the agents possess. In this example, an agent is proposing to allocate five 
allocate five Ethereum tokens (ETH) to Agent A for her contribution to fixing the bug 
XXX. The agents of the company vote and the majority, weighted by reputation, 
approve of this transfer. The contract automatically executes the suggested token 
allocation.  
This example could be adjusted in relation to conventional ITG practices, the same 
could be done for: 
• Determining and approving business requirements for IT systems. 
• Approving the purchase of new software or hardware for the company. 
• Overseeing departmental finances, including budgeting and forecasting. 
• Implementing procedures derived from policies 
• Reporting  
Figure 5.1: A Schematic Blockchain Company  
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It is evident from the example above that administrative tasks and decision making 
can be automated in a DAO. 
The tasks and decisions are guided by rules that cannot be broken; they can only be 
edited in accordance with the fundamental policies themselves. They may or may not 
be autonomous depending on the agency’s chosen governance system. For example, 
the agency can reserve a veto option on its own decision-making process for another 
agency (DAOStack, 2018).  
5.3. DAO Topologies 
There are various modes of decentralisation, and accordingly various modes to think 
about DAOs with respect to an agency (DAOStack, 2018). The most common way to 
conceptualise DAOs is in the assembly mode. 
5.3.1. Assembly Mode 
In the assembly mode, numerous agents take part in decision making within a single 
agency. This is done via smart contracts, assuming reputation or stake represents 
decision-making power. This model is distributed fairly but is difficult to scale due to 
the technical capacity required to process data while maintaining resilience.  
Scalability and resilience are addressed in the next section.   
5.3.2. Fractal Federal Governance mode 
The fractal federal mode is extreme in the sense that the DAO exists as an agency 
within a few agents, where each agent is an agency with agents. 
5.3.3. Complex mesh-network 
The complex mesh network arises from agencies within the infrastructure provided by 
the DAO stack. The governance part of DAOstack lies within the agency. Agency is a 
unit of governance in a state-transition function (DAOStack, 2018) that collects inputs 
from agents with Blockchain addresses and executes an output in terms of the state 
transition (Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: Governance State Transition (DAOStack, 2018). 
The following is an example of this state transition function in a complex mesh 
network: 
A simple agency called “Fundis” manages an Ethereum (ETH) fund. This agency has 
its own native token called FND, an acronym for Fundis. The agency has three basic 
governance rules: 
1. The first rule is that the only company-wide decision that the agency takes is 
to make investments. This is done by sending ETH from the main wallet to a 
certain Blockchain address. An agent within the company can initiate the 
action by proposing to send a specified amount of ETH to address A. Then all 
agents vote yes or no to the proposal, each vote is weighted by the number of 
FND that the vote has in their address.  
2. The second rule is that upon establishment, FND tokens are issued to buyers 
for a period of one week. The rate is one FND per ETH. 
3. The third rule is that any FND owner can send their token to the main Fundis 
wallet and in return get a share of the ETH. This is based on the existing ETH 
in the Fundis wallet at the moment. When the owner of the FND does this, the 
FND sent is destroyed in their wallet.  
 
As simple as this three-rule governance system is, there are some immediate issues: 
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a. It may be difficult get a majority vote on a proposal using weighting by stake. 
This issue is related to governance scalability. This is discussed in the next 
section.  
b. A 51% attack can hack this governance system. This can occur when a single 
agent has enough liquid capital to obtain more than half of the FND in the 
network. This results in one individual dominating the votes and influencing 
the governance of the DAO. This problem is related to resilience, which is 
covered in the next section.  
c. It is uncertain that the agents who hold the most tokens would make the best 
investment decisions. This brings up the question of meritocracy which is 
addressed in the next section.  
d. Another risk is if an agent proposes that all Fundis ETH be distributed into the 
addresses of agents that vote yes on a particular proposal. This scenario 
demonstrates that resilience is a complex issue to solve.  
e. Lastly, the creators of Fundi might eventually realise that the governance 
system is flawed. However, once the agency has been deployed that problem 
will be out of their control because the system is not upgradable. 
In the Fundis example, there are four types of inputs that agents can make in the 
organisations: 
• They can submit a proposal,  
• They can vote yes or no,  
• They can buy FND with ETH from the agency 
• They can send FND to the agency to claim back the ETH.  
Fundis as a DAO has three possible automated actions that it can make based on 
the rules of its governance system. They are: 
• Issue and send FND to send agents in the first week. 
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• Send ETH from its main wallet to agents who want to reclaim, while 
destroying the agents’ FND. 
• Send ETH to an address after a success proposal from the network.  
5.4. Solving the Fundis Problem 
5.4.1. Reputation Systems - Meritocracy 
Instead of basing votes on the number of tokens that agents hold, the company can 
create various balance sheets that denote the influence of agents. 
An agent cannot transfer reputation scores to another agent. It would not be practical 
to lend one’s reputation to someone else. However, it is possible that a company can 
create different types of reputation categories that can be assigned to separate roles 
or in different situations. Hence forming a meritocratic governance system that is 
based on the unique contributions of agents.  
One method of allocating reputation would be via proposals that are directly linked to 
the contributions or work performed, which can be recorded in the Blockchain. 
Reputation can also be programmed to include payments for agents that have been 
awarded reputation tokens. In DAOStack, this concept is called reputation flow 
(DAOStack, 2018).   
5.4.2. Scalability & Resilience 
Scalability and resilience are key factors in DAOs but can work against each other. 
This is because decentralisation requires an open protocol that is available to different 
participants under different rules. To have a resilient system, it is necessary that 
enough participants review decisions. However, it can be difficult to get the attention 
of all participants every time a decision needs to be made. Additionally, computing 
power may be limited and that could slow down the voting process when a DAO grows 
in number of participants.  
DAOStack proposes three ways to resolve the friction between scalability and 
resilience. These include compositionality, attention monetisation, and relative 
majority. These concepts are equivalent to Blockchain mechanisms known as 
Sharding, Gas and Off-chain computations. These concepts are discussed below. 
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5.4.3. Compositionality  
Compositionality can be described in the following two examples (Figure 5.3). 
Company A has nine agents with equal votes. Company B has three agents with equal 
votes. Each of those agents represent a sub-company composed of three human 
agents with equal votes. 
 
Figure 5.3: The Assembly Vs Federated Governance 
The sub-companies of Company B cast their votes as soon as they develop a decision 
based on the internal majority. 
In Company A, it requires the attention and consensus of a minimum of five human 
agents to make a decision. Whereas Company B needs only four human agents to 
make a decision. 
This example illustrates how fractalisation makes DAOs more scalable. 
Compositionality is key to scaling any system (Meredith, 2015). One can argue that 
compositionality means that a lower number of human agents can override the system, 
thereby compromising resilience. Nonetheless, in Company B, not just any 
arrangement of four human agents can form a decision in the mother company. Under 
different arrangements the resilience in Company B can be stronger or weaker.  
5.4.4. Monetization of Attention 
It requires attention and time to form a decision, and the more decisions that need to 
be made the more divided that attention becomes. To create a resilient system, 
attention can be monetised to reflect its scarcity. In the Ethereum network the pricing 
value required to execute a transaction is referred to as gas (Ethereum 2016), and in 
the Bitcoin Blockchain, these come down to transaction fees. For the governance of 
Company 
A 
Company 
B 
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DAOs, attention needs to be tokenised and that token should reflect the group of 
agents from which attention is required. In DAOStack, the internal decision can use 
DAO tokens, whereas inter-DAO activities use GENs - ecosystem tokens created by 
DAOStack. It is important to note that tokens do not buy decisions nor votes, they buy 
the attention over proposals. 
I. Relative Majority 
A straight-forward way of scaling decision making is by restricting the approval of 
decisions to a relative majority (DAOStack, 2018). This refers to the majority of those 
who cast votes and not necessarily all the voters in the system.  
 
Figure 5.4: Relative Majority Example 
In Figure 5.4, the voting power of the agents is represented by the size of the balls. 
The empty balls are individuals who have not cast any votes. The light balls symbolise 
individuals who have voted no, and the darker balls are for yes. It is evident that there 
is not absolute majority, but there is a relative majority.  
The relative majority requires a finite time window for the proposal to be considered. 
To solve this problem, other governance systems introduced a minimal amount of 
voting power that needs to be engaged into a decision to qualify that decision for 
approval. This is known as quorum. The disadvantage of quorum is that it is impossible 
to fix the right amount of it (DAOStack, 2018). The next section discusses a resilient 
governance protocol that filters the process of submitting proposals. 
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5.4.5. Attention Funnel  
Another way to improve scalability is to focus all of the attention at any given time on 
a few decisions thereby enhancing the attention per decision. This can be done by 
creating a number of steps that participants must follow.  The following steps are an 
example of this: 
1. Proposals: They are initiated by agents and all agents vote with a yes or no.  
2. Reputation: Votes are weighted with reputation tokens. 
3. Boosted Proposals: Boosted proposals are given finite time frames for voting. 
After the set time period, a relative majority of voter’s reputation is used to make 
a decision. 
4. Quiet Ending: The final decision cannot be changed for a fixed period of time 
after it becomes effective. This is to avoid finalisation attacks. E.g. If on the last 
day of voting, the majority changes from a yes to a no, the voting interval is 
extended for another day. 
5. Boosting Stack: There can only be a specified number of proposals at any 
given time. Any other proposals are queued and ranked by priority. When a 
proposal has been finalised, a queued proposal with the highest ranking enters 
the stack. 
6. Promotion: Anyone can promote a proposal to a higher ranking in the queue 
by placing GEN tokens in stake. If the proposal is successful, the promoter 
retrieves back his or her tokens plus some profit. Or else, the tokens are 
destroyed or sent to the DAO. 
7. Ranking System: The ranking system can be a programmable function that 
automatically ranks proposals based on priority or other variables. 
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5.5. Blockchain Governance Structure 
There are two types of actions that can be programmed into the governance of a DAO 
(DAOStack, 2018), permissible and forbidden actions.  
Permissible actions are operational rules that trigger the agency functionalities. For 
example, if the majority of reputation holders approve a proposal to issue a token, a 
token will automatically be issued. This will be based on smart contract triggers set out 
in the governance schemes.  
Forbidden actions are the restrictions that must be respected and cannot be violated, 
even by an approved scheme. For example, if the DAO approves one million tokens, 
token-issuance schemes will only function as long as the sum of the tokens issues is 
less than one million. These are called global constraints. Constraints can be 
upgradable if a predefined condition has been met.  
In DAOStack, global constraints and governance schemes are denoted in elements.  
Such elements provide protocols for governance and protocols to change the main 
protocols.  
5.6. Layers of DAOStack 
The DAOStack provides foundational tools for the creation, operation and governance 
of DAOs. In short, it can be compared to what WordPress does for the web.  
At the bottom of the DAOStack is Ethereum (Figure 5.5). This is the operating system 
for DAOStack. The next layer consists of public registries that are curated by the 
DAOStack community and serves the global ecosystem. 
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Figure 5.5: Layers of DAOStack 
All DAOs on DAOStack comprise of a series of smart contracts that are deployed 
through a governance framework called Arc. Arc forms part of a programming 
language called Solidity that was invented by the Ethereum. 
Above the Arc layer is the Alchemy layer. Alchemy is a Decentralised Application 
(DApp) that was built by DAOstack, it allows anyone to create a new DAO. This DApp 
relies on a JavaScript library that operates the Arc Solidity framework. Alchemy is 
designed to facilitate developers in creation applications without the need to work 
directly on the solidity code. 
Arc 
Arc is a basic operating system for DAOs. It is open source, modular and comes with 
a public library of template governance modules that are called elements. Elements 
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evolve based on the needs of the users because they allow users to easily modify or 
upgrade a governance system to fit an organisation’s needs.  
Agencies can create their own governance system by combining different elements, 
this specifies rules, policies, assignment of resources include tokens as well as non-
transferable assets like reputation.  
5.7. The Dao Hack 
In June 2016, a decentralised venture capital fund called The DAO was attacked by 
unknown hackers whom exploited vulnerabilities in the smart contracts. This attack 
highlighted that despite DAOs being self-governed engines, they still require effective 
IT governance and are subject to misuse. The vulnerability that lead to the hack was 
traced to an external call present in a code path that should have been allowed to be 
executed only once per stakeholder (BlockCast 2016). This code path was placed 
before a section of the code that revokes the rights of stakeholders to trigger the code 
path after its first execution. This vulnerability allowed the hacker to repeatedly execute 
the code path, thereby draining excessive funds from the contract than should have 
been possible (Leising, 2017).  
The hacker managed to drain 3.6 million ETH, which was worth approximately $50 
million at the time (Falkon, 2017). Fortunately, the funds were locked for 28 days due 
to the nature of the system, which prevents creators of Child-DAOs from withdrawing 
assets for a total of 27 days after creating the address (Sharma, 2017). This time frame 
gave the community a chance to diverge the protocol of the Ethereum chain to refund 
investors. 
Technically speaking, the hacker ran a valid smart contract on the system. However, 
it was ill-intentioned and manipulative. 
This is an aspect of DAOs that are difficult to manage because they stem from 
humans, and some may argue that humans are more difficult to govern than systems.  
Considering that up to 5% of all smart contracts are potentially in danger the demand 
for a decentralised auditing platforms and good governance grows (Block Cast, 2016). 
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The next section discusses how tacit and explicit knowledge could be used for 
effective governance, and how applying it could have possibly prevented this hack. 
5.8. Tacit vs explicit knowledge in business 
The cohesion of explicit and tacit knowledge is key in creating and understanding the 
dynamics of knowledge in an organisation (Computer Business Research, 2018). 
Explicit knowledge is used in a company to help sustain organisational procedures, as 
well as generate and articulate information and data accordingly (Evans & Smith, 
2001). 
Compared to Tacit knowledge, explicit knowledge is easier to transfer and map out in 
computer systems because it is direct and requires a lower level of context to be 
understood. Explicit knowledge is found in databases, memos, notes, documents, etc 
(Brézillon & Pomerol, 2002). 
On the other hand, tacit knowledge, which is knowledge that is stored in every person 
through his or her experiences, intuitions and observations is more difficult to transfer 
(Evans & Smith, 2001).  
In the case of The DAO hack, it would have required some experience and a strong 
technical background to identify the flaw in the code. Mostly because, at face value, 
there was nothing inherently wrong with the algorithm. It required strategic thinking to 
identify ways to either manipulate or prevent manipulation on the system. 
Solidity, the programming language used to build the DAO, was invented in 2014. The 
hack occurred in 2016, giving the community of developers two years to familiarise 
themselves with all aspects of the protocols. 
A combination of explicit and tacit knowledge of smart contracts, information security 
and hacking could have been instrumental in preventing the DAO hack. However, 
considering that DAOs are relatively new in the IT industry, there are a severe skill 
shortage in the space (Castillo, 2017). 
This case highlights that knowledge accumulated with years of experience is not only 
lacking in DAOs, but difficult to transfer in a digital environment where participants are 
located in difference parts of the world. This type of knowledge does not replace 
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explicit knowledge, but it plays a key role in monitoring, controlling and evaluating 
activities in DAOs.   
5.9. Implications of DAOs on ITG  
As outlined in Chapter 2, a literature review on ITG, COBIT (2015) describes 
governance as ensuring that stakeholder needs, conditions and options are evaluated 
to determine balanced, agreed-on enterprise objectives to be achieved; setting 
direction through prioritisation and decision making. In summary, COBIT suggests that 
the following aspects should be achieved for effective ITG: 
• Accountability of IT. 
• IT compliance to rules and regulations. 
• Satisfying the needs of the board and stakeholders. 
• Managing IT Risk. 
• Providing value to the business and control of work done, monitoring 
performance and compliance against agreed-on direction and objectives. 
5.10. Decision making in Hierarchical Organisations 
In general, CIOs make many important decisions a week, and they make them quickly 
with data that is gathered informally (CXO Systems , 2003). CXO research has found 
that CIOs make one to five significant decisions a week, which are made in ten to thirty 
minutes. Many CIOs rely on emails, staff and peer conversations to provide 
information that guides their decisions. According to CXO’s research on fifty CIOs 
most IT executives appear to gather anecdotal information and rely upon experience, 
intuition and tacit knowledge to synthesise information in order to make informed 
decisions.  
The study by CXO systems concludes the following: 
1. IT executives need real, unaltered and accurate information in order to make 
the best decisions. They require strategic information critically and focus most 
on business performs optimally. This can be difficult to do when people 
minimise negative information to portray that things are under control. This is 
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an aspect of human endeavours that is required but can be detrimental to 
decision making.  
2. CIOs mostly use acquired information from various sources which mostly 
include reports and emails and rely less on direct access to data. They rely on 
senior managers to report back on the summary of data or status of integrated 
systems. 
3. CIOs frequently measure the least important pieces of information and measure 
essential information less frequently. This is due to time sensitivity of different 
types of information, and the effort and costs involved in gathering frequent 
updates. 
4. IT executives can easily run the risk of being out of touch of the realities at 
operational level, this is because they do not deal directly with data at its source.  
 
5.11. Comparison of ITG Factors in DAOs and Hierarchical 
Organisations 
To establish whether DAOs extend or reduce the conventional roles of IT directors, 
this section includes a comparative study on the factors of ITG that are considered for 
decision making in hierarchical organisations (ISACA, 2012) and DAOs (DAOStack, 
2018). 
Governance factors taken from COBIT’s ITG definition was used as the main frame of 
reference. This helps to establish whether one case extends, corroborates, contradicts 
or corrects the other.  
The ground for comparison is that both organisational models are designed to direct 
and control enterprises. Hierarchical organisations are traditional and widely adopted, 
whereas DAOs are a novel modern concept. It is important to consider that DAOs are 
still being developed and experimented on and have not reached mainstream adoption 
(DAOStack 2018, Dash 2016, eInc 2017). Various organisations are exploring the 
possibilities of DAOs (Jentzsch, 2017, Buterin 2017). It is likely that further research 
will follow that will expand on the effective application of DAO frameworks. 
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Table 5.1 contains observations from the whitepaper of DAOStack and the guidelines 
of COBIT 5. These are simply high-level representations of the details elaborated in 
the respective white paper and guidelines. These factors were selected to reveal the 
differences and similarities between DAOs and Hierarchical organisations. 
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Table 5.1: Comparative analysis of Decision-Making Factors 
Governance Factors Hierarchical Organisations DAOStack 
Managing 
Stakeholders 
Different strategies are used to manage 
internal and external stakeholders.  
Stakeholders exist within the DAO as agents with 
weightings t measure influence. Stakeholders can be 
invited to vote on decisions in the DAO. 
Stakeholder Needs Stakeholder needs are often used to form 
organisational objectives; however, needs can 
conflict and require human judgement. 
Needs of stakeholders can be recorded as proposals 
with priority rankings. These proposals are executed as 
permissible actions in the DAO.  
Organisational 
objectives 
Objectives are based on a flexible framework 
that includes principles such as:  
• Alignment of IT and business strategy, 
• Managed IT-related business risk, 
• Delivery of IT services in line with business 
requirements. 
Using tacit and organisational knowledge, it is 
easier to identify high level objectives. 
 
High level objectives must be codified into measurable 
tasks and procedures, programmed into the 
governance protocol. Goals must be explicitly 
documented and coded. 
Business 
intelligence (BI) 
Tools 
Making decisions requires a balance of 
quantitative and qualitative approaches. BI 
tools can be used to form decisions. However, 
BI tools can be built as an application layer on top of 
the blockchain. However, decision-making power is 
distributed among agents who vote on proposals. 
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the decision maker also relies on tacit 
knowledge, interpretation of hard data, 
intuition, and technical skills.  
The responsibility and accountability of 
decisions are held by single individuals. E.g. 
CIO or CTO. 
Tokens like reputation or stake can be used to quantify 
decision-making power. Voting can be incentivised. 
Decision are automatically executed when there is a 
majority vote.  
 
Providing Value to 
the business 
Directors provide value by controlling, 
monitoring and evaluating the organisation. 
This requires them to make informed 
decisions and take accountability for those 
decisions.  
 
Value lies in the automated decision making, 
transparency, accuracy, resilience and meritocracy. 
Accountability of decisions is distributed across the 
network. 
Compliance to IT 
rules and regulation 
Internal and external auditors can be 
appointed to examine and analyse 
compliance. This process does not severely 
interfere with regular activity. 
IT rules and regulation are programmed as schemes in 
the smart-contract framework of DAOStack. Protocols 
must be upgraded when internal or external laws have 
changed. This may affect the availability of certain 
functions on the DAO. 
 
Managing Risk Directors are expected to recognise pain 
points and triggers related to IT risk such as 
data loss or project failure. All documented 
Pain point and triggers can be programmed into the 
governance protocol. Any vulnerabilities in the code 
can be extremely damaging to the DAO. 
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risks must be controlled at an acceptable 
level. 
 
IT Security Requires collaboration from all levels, it 
involves both IT and non-IT departments. IT 
Security policies are set by board members, 
interpreted as managerial procedures and 
formed into operational processes.  
Security risks should be assessed at inception in 
DAOs. It is difficult to refactor code after the DAO has 
been deployed. The advantage is that individuals 
cannot compromise the system. The disadvantage is 
that protocols may be “technically” correct but can be 
bypassed by manipulation. The risk is higher as it could 
affect the entire organisation. 
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5.12. Conclusion 
One can infer, based on DAOStack’s architecture, that DAOs effectively reduce the 
decision-making power of directors by codifying common governance processes. This 
is beneficial in reducing the risk of human error in DAOs. 
However, human centric skills such as tacit knowledge, intuition and experience are 
not easily transferable in DAOs. In the long run, and depending on the industry, the 
collaboration of virtual teams may be challenging as DAOs currently do not provide 
effective mechanisms for personal engagement. This may force IT directors to develop 
stronger influence-oriented skills to address some of COBIT’s IT related goals like risk 
awareness, teamwork, innovation, motivated personnel and learning. 
With that being said, DAOs can still be considered as an efficient way of conducting 
corporate voting, facilitating decision making such as appointing a CEO, paying 
salaries, proposing service level agreements. DAOStack demonstrates that smart 
agencies can function based on community rules, global constraints and business 
logic.  
5.13. Recommendations 
The example of DAOStack and other platforms (Ethereum 2016, eInc, 2017; Slock.It , 
2017) indicate that the future responsibilities of directors will focus less on control-
based tasks. Many of the examples given highlight democratic, peer-to-peer decision 
making.  
It is recommended that IT professionals, entrepreneurs and educational institutions 
prepare for the global digital economy by encouraging influence-oriented skills as 
opposed to control-based skills in governance. This is because Blockchain technology 
reduces the decision-making authority of directors, by relying on programmable 
governance protocols. The growing concept of decentralisation demands that IT 
directors in Blockchain act as orchestrators or facilitators and not as mechanics or 
controllers.  
Directors in DAOs must take on modern governance approaches to add value to the 
ecosystem. This can be done by expanding their scope of duties, relinquishing 
traditional powers and authority as well as facilitating collaboration. 
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6. Chapter 6 – Data Collection and Analysis 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter assesses the data collected from an online questionnaire that was 
completed by 10 Blockchain experts. The data collection process seeks to establish 
an understanding of the role of IT directors in Blockchain, particularly in DAOs.  
6.1.1. Background 
The experts that were approached for this exercise include directors in prominent 
global IT corporations; the head of operations in a leading Blockchain organisation; 
published Blockchain authors; a Professor with a PhD in Information Systems who 
specialises in smart contracts; Blockchain business owners; and CTOs in Blockchain 
start-ups. Each of the individuals participated voluntarily and anonymously.   
6.2. Overview of Data collection  
6.2.1. Identifying Participants 
To send the questionnaire to the most appropriate participants, the researcher 
conducted an industry analysis over the course of six months and created a list of 
attributes to look out for in participants before approaching them. This exercise 
provided the researcher with the knowledge to properly identify individuals with the 
most relevant experience and knowledge. 
All participants were contacted individually based on their background in Blockchain, 
their current or previous work in Blockchain as well as their experience in the corporate 
world.  
The characteristics of participants include any one or more of the following: 
• He/she has published and/or presented research on DAOs. 
• He/she has worked or currently works in a position related to Blockchain 
technology. 
• He/she has more than 10 years’ work experience and understands enterprise 
governance and concepts of ITG. 
• He/she has a background in IT, software development or solution architecture. 
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6.2.2. Ethical considerations  
While the results of the questionnaire are published, the information pertaining to the 
identities of the participants have not been disclosed to maintain objectivity and 
integrity in the analysis. The questions were carefully written to avoid bias or 
misleading information.  
Participants were informed about their rights to ignore certain questions in the 
questionnaire and to withdraw at any point during the study. The questionnaire was 
disseminated widely to 50 Blockchain experts in different countries around the world. 
6.2.3. Data Collection Steps  
The steps for collecting data for this research were as follows: 
I. Step 1: Identifying Objectives: Processes that contribute towards ITG  
For the purpose of this study, COBIT’s framework was used as a basis to formulate 
questions. This step was fundamental in creating a relationship between governance 
in hierarchical organisations and in DAOs. In COBIT 5, there are five main ITG 
processes that directors are expected to follow (Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: ITG Processes 
Process Code Name 
EDM01 Ensure Governance Framework Setting and Maintenance 
EDM02 Ensure Benefits Delivery 
EDM03 Ensure Risk Optimisation 
EDM04 Ensure Resource Optimisation 
EDM05 Ensure Stakeholder Transparency 
 
Each of the abovementioned processes have practices, inputs, outputs and 
associated goals. However, due to the complex nature of corporate governance 
(Kemp et al., 2017), this research considered the governance processes only to 
express the wider, macro system of governance. This approach goes in line with 
COBIT principle 4 – Enabling a holistic approach as outlined in Chapter 2. 
II. Step 2: Aligning the COBIT Processes with the Research Questions 
Table 6.2 highlights why it was relevant to derive questions from each COBIT5 
process: 
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Table 6.2: Relevance of Questions based on Governance Processes 
ITG Process Relevance in DAOs IT Goals  
Ensure 
Governance 
Framework 
Setting and 
Maintenance 
In DAOs, Governance Frameworks are 
transcribed into programmable code. 
Therefore, it is important that 
participants in a network form a robust 
governance protocol. According to 
COBIT 5, this process involves 
analysing and articulating the 
requirements of enterprise IT. It also 
involves putting in place effective 
structures, principles and practices, with 
clarity of responsibilities and authority to 
achieve the enterprise’s mission, goals 
and objectives. 
• Alignment of IT and 
Business Strategy. 
• Commitment of 
Executives for making 
It related decision.  
• Delivery of IT 
Services in line with 
Business 
Requirements. 
Ensure 
Benefits 
Delivery 
DAOs are created to deliver benefits to 
the entire entity and participants 
democratically and transparently. This 
process is necessary to prevent groups 
of individuals from leaving the DAO 
through a hard fork or finding ways to 
corrupt the system. Therefore, IT assets 
and returns on investment should be 
accurately delivered throughout the 
system. 
• Enterprise achieves 
optimal value of IT. 
• Optimal IT value 
creation with 
management.  
• Individual IT 
Investment Value 
Contribution. 
Ensure Risk 
Optimisation 
DAOs are vulnerable to IT risks because 
important information is constantly 
exchanged within them. The 
organisation’s risk appetite should be 
agreed upon, understood and clearly 
articulated to all participants. This can 
help prevent risks such as hacks, hard 
• Identify IT Risks, 
Communicate It 
Thresholds 
• Effective Management 
of Critical IT Risks 
• It Risks are kept 
within Appetite 
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forks and manipulation of people or 
processes. 
Ensure 
Resource 
Optimisation 
It is important that well governed 
organisations ensure adequate and 
sufficient IT related capabilities. This 
includes its people, processes and 
technology. Much like Hierarchical 
organisations, DAOs require all three to 
operate effectively. 
• Resource needs to be 
met with optimal 
capabilities. 
• Resource allocation 
within budget 
constraints. 
• Optimal use of 
resources throughout 
life cycle. 
Ensure 
Stakeholder 
Transparency 
This process ensures that stakeholder 
communication is clear and transparent 
and that requirements are met. In 
DAOs, this process is crucial to in 
acquiring external buy-in and 
investments, particularly when launching 
ICOs. This process includes assurance 
review reports and the assessment of 
reporting effectiveness.  
• Commitment of 
Executive to make IT 
Decisions 
• Transparency of IT 
costs, Benefits and 
Risk 
• Delivery of IT Service 
in Line with Business 
Requirements 
 
III. Step 3: Questionnaire Design 
The questionnaire was exploratory, and the questions were open-ended. The 
questionnaire was designed to allow participants to openly share their thoughts on 
governance in DAOs and provide insight for their reasoning, thereby achieving an 
epistemological approach, as discussed in Chapter 4. Additionally, there was a 
specific focus on facilitating the interpretation process by phrasing the questions 
clearly, descriptively and including examples. This improves credibility of the 
interpretation and falls in line with the research design choice of interpretivism. 
The questionnaire was also designed with the research objectives in mind. Each 
question aims to probe at topics associated with the main research questions. 
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However, the researcher was aware that due to time constraints the questionnaire can 
only address high-level aspects of governance.  
IV. Step 4: Questionnaire Administration 
Participants were asked to complete the questionnaire online using a survey platform 
called TypeForm. The selected participants are all involved in the Blockchain industry 
and understand DAOs and corporate governance. This goes in line with the cardinal 
principle of context as mentioned in Chapter 4.  
V. Step 5: Interpretation of Results (Data Analysis) 
The interpretation of results was done using thematic coding and was administered 
using a qualitative analysis software tool called Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) Miner.  
The coding methods rely on a set of predefined themes based on the notions and in 
the responses. The researcher placed an emphasis on triangulation, as mentioned in 
Chapter 4. Triangulation was performed to avoid systematic bias. The use of multiple 
diverse data sources and the information from the case study in Chapter 5 was used 
as background while reviewing the results to develop a comprehensive understanding 
of the phenomena.  
Figure 6.1 illustrates the themes that were derived from the results. 
  
Figure 6.1: Coded Theme Structure 
Table 6.3 describes each of the codes and the theme they represent.  
 
 
ITG Process
Unconventional Conventional Ambiguous
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Table 6.3: Thematic Code Description 
Code Description 
Unconventional ITG  The sentiment represents an unconventional ITG process 
that is not described in the COBIT 5 guidelines. This has to 
do with roles and responsibility, accountability, 
decentralisation of authority and distribution of decision 
making. 
Conventional ITG  The sentiment leans towards a conventional ITG process 
that is mentioned in COBIT 5 guidelines. This can be found 
in Chapter 2, section 2.4.4. 
Ambiguous This code refers to sentiments that are mixed 
(conventional and unconventional governance) or neither. 
 
Ultimately the responses amounted to 70 unique answers that are attached in 
Appendix B, and the summary results are discussed in section 6.3. These results were 
carefully reviewed, organised and indexed according to codes that represent common 
themes. The researcher read and reviewed all 70 answers and made comments to 
each, this detailed interpretation can be found in Appendix C. The coding process was 
repeated several times in order to finetune the codes into three high level themes. 
6.3. Questions & Results 
The questionnaire consisted of seven questions and was distributed to over 50 
participants over a period of two months. Due to the research being a cross sectional 
study, the first 10 respondents were used. The questions and their respective results 
are as follows: 
I. Question 1 
This question aims to establish how a conventional governance practice like 
programme creation would be dealt with in a DAO theoretically. Depending on the 
organisation, a programme director can be part of the board of directors or work 
outside of the board. This practice under the COBIT 5 Process EDM01- Ensuring 
Governance Framework Setting and Maintenance. The question is: 
 Chapter 6 – Data Collection and Analysis 
93 
 
“In hierarchical organisations, boards often appoint programme managers who create 
and implement IT Programmes. These outline the processes of managing several 
related projects, often with the intention of improving an organisation's performance. 
How do you think a programme would be implemented in a DAO, and would a director 
be responsible for that?” 
Figure 6.2: Results of Question 1 
 
Data Presentation: 
The results of this question reveal that there is a dominant notion of unconventional 
Governance when it comes to EDM01. Most of the responses included hypothetical 
ideas of what would occur if a programme manager was appointed in a DAO. Several 
respondents mentioned that individuals in the network could still appoint and MD or 
program manager but that it should be a democratic and decentralised process. 
However, based on the case study research on DAOStack, there is no explicit rule on 
programme management within a DAO.  
Inference: 
The data implies that improving an organisation’s performance through the use of 
programme management will require unconventional governance practices.  
Unconventional IT 
Governance
67%
Ambiguous
33%
Question 1-
Percentage of code Distribution
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Despite this dominant theme, there seems to be a significant amount of ambiguity and 
uncertainty from the subject matter experts on this topic. 33% of the responses 
indicate that the respondents are unsure about the responsibilities of a programme 
manager in a decentralised autonomous organisation. This implies that it may not be 
necessary to have programme managers or that this is a challenge that has not yet 
been identified. 
II. Question 2 
This question aims to understand the steps that a director would have to follow to 
achieve goals outlined for process EDM01 in table 6.1. The objective of this question 
was to assess whether participants believe directors would follow conventional 
governance guidelines in DAOs. The question is as follows: 
“How would an IT director in a DAO ensure that the main governance protocol is 
maintained?” 
Figure 6.3: Results of Question 2 
 
Data Presentation: 
The results of question two reveal a dominant notion of unconventional governance 
(60%). Although unconventional governance is the strongest theme here, it appears 
that a certain degree of conventional governance is expected for EDM 02, ensuring 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Unconventional IT 
Governance; 60%
Conventional IT 
Governance; 20%
Ambiguous; 20%
Question 2-Percentage of code Distribution
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that the governance protocol of a DAO is properly maintained. Similar to question one, 
these results also indicate 20% level of uncertainty or ambiguity surrounding this 
governance process. 
Inference: 
This data implies that  
a) There is still a significant amount of uncertainty and conflicting views on 
governance in DAOs.  
b) The implications of blockchain on governance is extensive and has not 
yet been fully unpacked or explored for most. However, there are 
expectations that a community of members in a DAO would collectively 
assume the responsibility that a director in a hierarchal organisation 
would. It appears that decision rights, incentives and accountability are 
radically divorced from conventional governance models.  
III. Question 3 
This question was centred on ensuring benefits delivery, process EDM02. The aim 
was to assess how participants believe directors would plan for and control company 
benefits, using the example of return on investments in a DAO. The question was: 
“How do you think an IT Director can/should secure optimal value of the hardware and 
software of DAOs? E.g. If the members of a DAO vote to invest on scaling the network 
which will require more processing power and new servers… would a director measure 
the return on investment privately?” 
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Figure 6.4: Results of Question 3 
 
Data Presentation: 
In these results 58% of the sentiments were associated with unconventional 
governance. It is clear that the dominant sentiment from respondents is that 
unconventional governance practices are required for optimising the hardware and 
software. Suggestions included absolute transparency and giving all members of a 
DAO access to data that would otherwise be confidential in hierarchical organisations. 
Some respondents made suggestions of using cloud storage, which is a conventional 
practice but the application of it unconventional. There were also some uncertainties 
in the responses. 
Inference: 
The data implies that there are different ways of securing value in DAOs and it is 
largely dependent on the creators and participants’ decisions. It appears governance 
is acutely flexible in this regard. This falls in line with the principles of DAOStack that 
advocates for a decentralised yet community governance organisation.  
Unconventional IT 
Governance
58%
Conventional IT 
Governance
17%
Ambiguous
25%
Question 3-Percentage of code Distribution
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It would be fair to say that the optimising the hardware and software in a blockchain 
has no definitive processes and that it depends on several factors. These factors could 
include use cases and the mandates between members of the DAO.  
IV. Question 4 
This question addresses one of the commonly debated aspects of Blockchain 
technology, decentralisation. The question aims to establish whether participants 
believe certain information would theoretically be kept private by a director in order to 
support the business. Information is a vital business asset and a key part of a CIO ’s 
role is to form information security strategies that protect the organisation (Tharakan, 
2016). The question was: 
“Would a director in a DAO keep a private and accurate ledger of costs and estimated 
benefits that will support the business?” 
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Figure 6.5: Results of Question 4 
 
Data Presentation: 
The results of this question show that unconventional governance is preferred and 
expected when it comes to the accessibility of financial information. This is evident 
with more than half of the respondent’s vouching for a public ledger of costs. 60% of 
the overall sentiment is that costs, invoices and any payment related data should be 
accessible to all members of the DAO.  
Inference: 
It is still clear that there is no single way to enforce governance in DAOs. Most 
respondents believe it is up to the peer to peer community to decide what is private 
and public. The dominant theme implies that it is unnecessary to have a single 
authority to oversee and control costs.  In saying that, one cannot ignore that 30% of 
the sentiment leans towards conventional governance practices. This could imply that 
the first and foremost aspect of running a business on blockchain is to accept that 
some degree of centralisation is necessary when initialising a DAO and that ensuring 
a sound governance protocol is a key aspect of enforcing fairness and transparency. 
These two aspects are synonymous with conventional governance.  
Unconventional IT 
Governance
60%
Conventional IT 
Governance
30%
Ambiguous
10%
Question 4 -Percentage of code 
Distribution
 Chapter 6 – Data Collection and Analysis 
99 
 
V. Question 5 
Question five addresses EDM05 and EDMO02. It aims to discover how the needs of 
stakeholders would be met in a business that runs as a DAO. As well as the types of 
controls that could be used to facilitate decision-making. The objective was to identify 
whether the answer differs to conventional ways of managing stakeholders in 
hierarchical organisations. The question was: 
“How would a director measure the level of stakeholder satisfaction in a DAO? Are 
KPIs implemented into the System? If so, would this be stored privately?” 
 
Figure 6.6: Results of Question 5 
 
Data Presentation: 
These results show that 50% of the sentiment leans towards conventional governance. 
A lower but significant 40% of the overall sentiment reveals nuances of unconventional 
governance. The over-arching notion of the responses indicate that a certain degree 
of conventional governance will inevitably take place when assessing stakeholder 
satisfaction. This being due to the human-centric and case by case nature of 
stakeholder management.  
Unconventional IT 
Governance
40%Conventional IT 
Governance
50%
Ambiguous
10%
Question 5- Percentage of code distribution
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Inference: 
Contrary to most of the answers, this topic reveals a stronger theme of conventional 
governance. It re-enforces the fact that governance is a complex discipline. It indicates 
that governance in a DAO has a middle ground between unconventional and 
conventional practices. It suggests that running a business regardless of a type of 
technology used might still require traditional governance approaches. 
VI. Question 6 
This question addresses EDM03 – Ensuring risk optimization. The purpose of this 
question was to ascertain whether IT directors would use similar methods and 
processes to manage risk and whether that would be their responsibility entirely. 
According to ISACA, owning IT risks and giving direction for managing key risks are 
fundamental aspects of ITG (Hardy, 2005). However, DAOs are proving to challenge 
that. To determine that, the question was: 
“How would an IT director ensure that risks are mitigated in DAOs? Is it their 
responsibility alone? E.g. a 51%Attack, or a Hard Fork” 
Figure 6.7: Results of Question 6 
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Data Presentation: 
The data reveals a dominant theme (64%) of conventional governance practices. Most 
participants suggest that risk specialist or blockchain auditors would be appointed to 
address security risks such as the ones mentioned in the question. 18% of the overall 
sentiment reveals ambiguity or uncertainty and another 18% indicates that 
unestablished governance approaches could be invented and applied to assess risk 
issues. Some respondents suggested that the risk is spread across a blockchain 
network and other reinforced that by advocating that risk is a collective responsibility. 
Inference: 
It appears that when it comes to risk mitigation, a major theme is that the same 
hierarchical governance approach applies. Some of the responsibilities that are 
traditionally assigned to CIOS are assigned to DAO participants for this process. There 
is still a small amount of ambiguity and uncertainty, thereby indicating that there is no 
definitive way of managing risk, and no explicit rule on who should manage risk in a 
DAO. 
VII. Question 7 
The last question supports EDM03 and EDM04. It aims to address how resources can 
be optimised to help secure the organisation and how to mitigate the risk of human 
resources abusing information or processes within the organisation. The question was: 
“It is expected that in some DAOs, agents will work remotely, and virtual teams will 
exist. This could be seen as a recipe for disaster by those who prefer to work with 
others in person. E.g. The DAO Hack in 2016 was the cause of an anonymous agent 
in a DAO who manipulated a smart contract to leak millions of funds. How could IT 
directors this be prevent these types of risks in DAOs?” 
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Figure 6.8: Results of Question 7 
 
Data Presentation: 
The results of this question reveal a dominant theme (55%) of unconventional 
governance. However, there are subtle mentions of conventional governance 
practices (36%) and a smaller percentage (9%) of ambiguity or mixed sentiments. 
Respondents made mentioned of new processes like Know your Colleagues (KYC), 
and some were adamant that directors should be responsible for assessing risk. 
Inference: 
Interestingly, this question addressed similar areas of governance to the previous one, 
yet the dominant theme in this one is unconventional governance. The outcome of this 
question reveals vast contradictions among experts. The logical inference is that there 
are numerous ways of practicing risk management in a DAO, and conventional 
governance could be an option.  
54,50%
36,40%
9,10%
Unconventional IT Governance
Conventional IT Governance
Ambiguous
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
QUESTION 7- PERCENTAGE OF CODE DISTRIBUTION
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The overall code distribution for all questions is depicted in Figure 6.9  
Figure 6.9: Overall Distribution of Codes 
 
The results reveal a majority sentiment of unconventional ITG . Although experts do 
think DAOs would require conventional governance processes in some areas, 
specifically in managing risk and stakeholders, all other areas of governance would 
require processes that are not outlined in COBIT 5. This includes the decentralisation 
of information repositories, decision making and the distribution of authority to groups 
of random individuals. 
6.4. Challenging Opposing Views 
In Chapter 4, the importance of intellectual integrity was highlighted and explained. In 
line with the selected research approach, and to maintain an unbiased view on the 
phenomena, several opposing views were identified and explored to challenge the 
main perspective and allow for critical thinking. In addition to some of the opposing 
views shared in the questionnaire results, Appendix B, the following are opposing 
ideas that challenge the hypothesis.  
One of the most opposing views was received as an email response from an invited 
participant. The participant, an author of a book on Bitcoin, did not to complete the 
questionnaire but has publicly claimed that there is no such thing as Blockchain. The 
author suggested the researcher read his book to understand this statement. The 
Unconventional 
IT Governance; 
51%
Conventional IT 
Governance ;
32% Ambiguous; 
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researcher took that as opportunity to explore this opinion. In summary, the author 
argues that Blockchain has no real value without Bitcoin. The last chapter of the book 
explains why Blockchain is unlikely to offer economic advantages for any commercial 
problem other than the one it was specifically engineered to solve, digital cash. 
Critics of the author’s book on Amazon (Light, 2018) have argued that while the author 
demonstrates a clear understanding of Bitcoin, in the tenth chapter he seems to 
misconstrue of the meaning of public, private, or permissioned Blockchains and how 
the latter may be more useful than a centralised database in some cases (Light, 2018). 
Along with other online and offline debates, it is evident that there are many polarised 
views on this topic. Although they are not included in the primary data of this 
dissertation, the researcher has brought forward these topics at conferences, panel 
discussions and online forums (The DAO Hub, 2018; ISACA Engagement Forum, 
2018; Blockchain Africa Conference, 2018) in an effort to gather more insight and 
perspective. 
Overall, it appears that certain groups of people are adamant that Blockchain will 
revolutionise many sectors of the global economy (CSIR, 2018; Mougayar & Buterin, 
2016; Swan, 2015; Tapscott ,2015), while others believe Blockchain is not clearly 
defined which makes it is difficult to identify the value it brings (Jeffries, 2018; Ammous 
2016).  
Much like the author who claimed Blockchain did not exist, it must be mentioned that 
critics have been known to use technical ambiguities to justify the notion that 
Blockchain is improperly defined, thus serving as the main argument against what is 
generally understood to be Blockchain. The subject matter continues to spark a range 
of discussions and some critics express a contentious opinion in order to provoke 
debate or test the strength of the opposing arguments (Avital et al., 2016). 
Despite the opposing views and debates on Blockchain, there is still a growing 
increase in the experimentation of the technology around the world. In South Africa, a 
consortium of leading banks formed a distributed ledger system for interbank clearing, 
this was called Project Khoka (SARB 2018). As described in Chapter 3, International 
banking consortium R3 is proactively enforcing the technology to achieve efficiency in 
record keeping between banks and execution of institutions’ financial agreements (R3, 
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2018). These are only but a few examples of large multinational corporations 
experimenting with Blockchain. 
6.5. Analysis of the COBIT RACI chart 
To thoroughly exhaust the analysis process of this chapter, this section aims to further 
highlight the disparities within COBIT’s IT governance framework in relation to the 
ideas that have been expressed in the questionnaire and the case study. The objective 
is to provide enough context from which recommendations can be made.  
Although COBIT 5 is a good-practice framework that provides an end-to-end guideline 
of ITG, there are certain inconsistencies that have already been identified through 
other research (Catarino, Fragoso, Da Silva, & Vasconcelos, 2016). These 
inconsistencies lie between the roles’ assignments which are defined in the 
assignment’s matrix charts of COBIT 5 (RACI). It is also acknowledged by other 
researchers, that COBIT is impractical and not easy to understand (Zhang & Le Fever, 
2013).  
One of the main reasons why COBIT is impractical is that it does not provide 
suggestions on how to customise the framework for a unique environment (Zhang & 
Le Fever, 2013), and a DAO is an exceptional untapped environment. In addition to 
this, there are currently no proven studies or statistics confirming the advantages of 
COBIT in Blockchain based companies. Moreover, as other research has shown, the 
RACI charts is not a “one size fits all”, as different organisations have different 
structures and may assign certain responsibilities to different individuals (Zhang, 2013; 
Catarino, et al., 2016).  
These inconsistencies not only lead to the inaccurate definition or roles and 
responsibilities in an organisation but could ultimately lead to ineffective ITG (Catarino, 
Fragoso, Da Silva, & Vasconcelos, 2016).  
Although ISACA has a disclaimer in COBIT 5, stating that readers should apply their 
own professional judgement to their educational resource (ISACA, 2012), they sell 
courses and provide certifications based on this content. These certificates claim to 
make professionals more employable and give them proven experience so that they 
are capable of bringing IT Governance into an organisation (ISACA, 2012). However, 
there is no mention of decentralised autonomous organisations.  
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With this in mind, the researcher chose to go one step further to point out the gaps in 
the COBIT’s RACI Chart in relation to Blockchain companies. Each EDM process is 
analysed to assess the role of CIOs. For this analysis, the role of CTO is excluded 
because COBIT does not provide a clear distinction between this role and what it calls 
the head of IT operations (ISACA, 2012). Depending on how an enterprise arranges 
its board, the head of IT operations may or may not be an official director (ISACA, 
2012). Nonetheless, the analysis of CIO is assessed in the following section.  
6.5.1. RACI charts 
To provide background to the reader, the following is a brief definition of a RACI chart 
and its purpose; 
RACI is an acronym that stands for responsible, accountable, consulted and informed 
(Kantor, 2018). The Chart is a matrix to achieve the most effective definition and 
documentation of roles and responsibilities in an organisation or in a project (Haworth, 
2018). The RACI chart also contains various organisational structures that can be 
further elaborated in different parts of an organisation’s policy or mandates (COBIT, 
2012). 
Definitions of the RACI Categories 
• Responsible: the individual who performs the process or task. 
• Accountable: the individual or group who holds accountability. They have the 
authority to approve, disapprove or veto a decision.  
• Consulted: the individual that needs to feedback and contribute to the process 
or task. 
• Informed: the individual that needs to be informed of decision or actions. This 
is one-way communication.   
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In Table 6.4, the CIO is responsible for evaluating, directing and monitoring the 
governance system. So far, this study has established that in DAOs this responsibility 
is distributed to a community within a network. The RACI charts associate 
responsibilities to roles, however role assignment in DAOs are not denoted in this way. 
Therefore, this chart would not be useful or applicable in a DAO. 
Table 6.4: EDM01 RACI Chart 
 
Table 6.5 demonstrates that CIOs should be responsible for the evaluating, directing 
and monitoring optimisation of resources. This process formed part of question 3 the 
questionnaire, where 58% of the sentiments revealed unconventional ways of 
performing value optimisation, with an emphasis of community management and open 
cloud computing and storage. This table indicates that only one individual is 
responsible for these processes. This contradicts the approaches that were described 
in the DAO case study. Thereby confirming that there are new ways of assigning 
responsibilities in an organisation which are not demonstrated in COBIT5. This 
validates the notion that current ITG frameworks have gaps. These gaps, if identified 
by ISACA, could be addressed and spark the modernisation of governance.   
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Table 6.5: EDM02 RACI Chart 
 
Table 6.6: EDM03 RACI Chart 
 
Table 6.6 highlights the risk management processes and specifies that the CIO is 
responsible for all three. As mentioned in the DAO Case Study and highlighted several 
times in the questionnaire data, there is often no single party responsible for risk in a 
DAO. The management of risk is distributed to all members of the blockchain network.   
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Table 6.7: EDM04 RACI Chart 
 
Table 6.7 and 6.8 reveal that CIOs are expected to take full responsibility for resource 
and stakeholder management. Each of these processes, as outlined by the case study 
and questionnaire results are not entirely applicable in DAOs. In DAOs, the processes 
are transcribed into governance protocols and stakeholders are integrated into the 
system. 
Table 6.8: EDM05 RACI Chart 
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6.6. Recommendations 
At this point, it is clear that Blockchain enables secure exchange of value without the 
need for a third-party authority (Schweinitz & Ferr, 2018) , therefore it is expected that 
sectors fuelled by record keeping and verification will be disrupted.  
A Gartner report (2018) indicates that although 91% of directors have heard of 
Blockchain, they do not necessarily have a clear understanding of its implications. The 
report also reveals that 36% believe Blockchain provides a great opportunity and 21% 
see it as a threat (Panetta, 2017). Moreover, an ITG framework like COBIT is not 
practical when applied in decentralised organisations. Research has revealed that 
COBIT’s actual utilisation and effectiveness is not clear due to the lack of academic 
studies and the proliferation of other IT Standards (Zhang & Le Fever, 2013). 
To ease the learning curve for individuals venturing into blockchain and to provide a 
basis for further research, the following three recommendations have been made:  
• The COBIT Framework could be extended to provide guidelines for DAOs, as 
evidently the RACI charts and the EDM processes are more suited for 
traditional hierarchical governance.  
• Boards should begin practising influence-oriented governance as opposed to 
the traditional control-based approaches in order to prepare for the fourth 
industrial revolution. 
• CIOs are encouraged to keep observing their surrounding ecosystem for 
improvements in processes and disruptions that may affect their business. They 
can start by investing in research and development of emerging technologies 
at their organisation. Blockchain will especially affect the supply chain industry, 
payments, public sectors and any other industries that rely heavily on 
information or digital assets.   
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6.7. Conclusion 
A number of critical factors were covered in this chapter that have led to this 
conclusion. The chapter covered the steps taken to prepare the data collection 
process, it provided clear and succinct data, including the summarised and detailed 
versions (in Appendix B and C). It also detailed the technique used to analyse and 
interpret the data. Without these factors it would have been difficult to generate 
recommendations.  
A fundamental part of this chapter was the data collection. The online questionnaire 
was distributed to participants who fit the research criteria. Ten of those participants 
completed the questionnaire anonymously and the results were coded by theme and 
summarised. The data was administered using two tools; 1- TypeForm, and online 
platform that specialises in dynamic form questionnaires and 2- QDA Miner, a data 
analysis program designed to assist researchers in managing, coding and analysing 
qualitative data.  
A qualitative approach was most suitable for the data collection as it provided deep 
insight into the human experiences and observations, it also allowed the researcher 
to explore the theoretical effect of decentralisation.  
This chapter was central to the dissertation and necessary in delivering a logical and 
sound argument that supports the hypothesis. The findings, extrapolated from the 
experts’ insights, the critical analysis of opposing views and the literature studies, 
revealed that conventional IT Governance is not suitable for DAOs. This confirms that 
the use of blockchain technology is giving rise to new governance models, which 
coincides with research from Gartner on how Blockchain will impact boards (Panetta, 
2017). 
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7. Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
7.1. Introduction 
This study was intended to not only demystify Blockchain technology but explore its 
implications on ITG. The aim was to identify the impact that Blockchain technology 
could theoretically have on governance disciplines by examining the roles and 
responsibilities of directors in hierarchical organisations and contrasting them to those 
in Decentralised Autonomous Organisations (DAOs). It was important to establish 
whether the research findings corroborate or invalidate the notion that Blockchain will 
disrupt money, business, economics and governance (Swan, 2015; Tapscott 2016; 
Mougayar & Buterin, 2016). 
The research was an empirical qualitative, inductive and cross-sectional study of the 
governance processes in Blockchain organisations. The primary data for this research 
was attained through a questionnaire and the secondary data was collected through 
single case study on a Blockchain operating system designed for collective 
intelligence. The research included two literature reviews, the first on ITG and the 
second on Blockchain technology. 
To successfully examine the impact of a modern technology, an inductive approach 
was applied as it allowed the researcher to develop a theory through observations of 
the empirical word. Furthermore, it was necessary to apply inductive reasoning as 
there are few prior theories or explanations on this subject matter. However deductive 
reasoning was applied to certain aspects of the research that have already been 
conceptualised and written in theory, such as COBIT’s ITG processes. 
After collecting and analysing data, the main premise emerged. The premise being 
that conventional ITG cannot be applied squarely into Blockchain based organisations, 
from this premise one can deduce that ITG is impacted in various ways by Blockchain. 
This is elaborated on in the conclusions section of this chapter. 
The general aim of this chapter is to highlight how the research objectives were 
achieved and to provide answers to the research questions outlined in Chapter 1. 
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The remainder of this chapter revisits the research problem as laid out in Chapter 1, 
then stipulates the conclusions and reasoning for them, it then highlights the research 
limitations, provides recommendations for further research and finally describes the 
contribution that this study has had to the IT industry. 
7.2. Revisiting the Problem 
The goal of this research was to develop a sound inductive hypothesis that 
substantiates the aforementioned premise. To pursue this goal, the research needed 
to meet certain objectives. The following is a list of the research objectives and a 
description of how they were met.  
7.2.1. Objective 1  
The first objective was to explain how IT governance works, and what conventional 
frameworks look like. The first literature review, Chapter 2, examined three different 
frameworks and guidelines for governance. This included ITIL, COBIT and ISO27002. 
For the remainder of the research, COBIT; one of the most popular guidelines (Mohr, 
2011; Tittel & Kyle, 2018)  was used as the main frame of reference. 
7.2.2. Objective 2 
The second objective was to explain what Blockchain technology is. This was 
achieved by demystifying some of the technical concepts in the second literature 
review, Chapter 3. The literature review covered the different layers of Blockchain 
using the example of Bitcoin. It also explored the origins of the technology and how it 
has evolved into Blockchain 2.0, smart contracts and Blockchain 3.0, a new model for 
organised activity. The study demonstrated that up until now – 2018, there have been 
very few applications in the category of Blockchain 3.0. This is important to consider 
because this research applies mostly to this category. Thus, the hypothesis will 
certainly require further testing as society evolves and more organisations begin to 
adopt the technology. 
7.2.3. Objective 3 
The third objective was to conduct a case study on an existing Blockchain application 
that challenges conventional governance and to identify patterns that could substitute 
ITG processes as outlined by COBIT 5.  
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This objective was achieved through the case study in Chapter 5. This case study 
demonstrated how an operating system for collective intelligence has created ways to 
automate decision making, including some of the typical decisions that a CIO or CTO 
would make. The case study laid out various DAO Topologies, explained the 
decentralised model of proposals and voting and how consensus can be achieved 
using governance protocols.  
7.2.4. Objective 4  
Some of the conventional governance processes as outlined in COBIT were proven 
to be possible in a DAO. This was depicted in a comparative analysis of factors that 
contribute towards decision making in hierarchical organisations versus in DAOs.  
However, despite having found that certain governance processes could be 
automated, there were aspects of decision making that were considered to still require 
tacit and organisational knowledge from an experienced individual. This would be 
difficult to achieve in a DAO with virtual teams. 
7.2.5. Objective 5 
The final objective of this research was to identify the impact that Blockchain could 
theoretically have on ITG in the future. This was achieved by combining the primary 
data collected, the case study, as well as the literature reviews together and analysing 
this information to confirm the hypothesis. To establish impact, a list of ITG processes 
from COBIT 5 were used as measurement indicators. This is explained further in the 
next section.  
7.3. Conclusions 
This section draws inferences from the culmination of data and analysis performed in 
this study, and in relation to research questions. As mentioned in the research and 
methodology chapter, an inductive study begins with no hypothesis, but a proposed 
theory (Singh & Nayak, 2015).  The researcher must then provide substantial findings 
to confirm the proposed theory, which can only be done when the study is complete 
(Bruce, 2007).  
After collecting and analysing data, the main premise emerged. The premise is that 
conventional IT governance does not fit squarely into DAOs. Having said that, it is 
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important to note that the conclusions in an inductive argument is at best probable if a 
strong inference from the premise is made (Steup, 2005).  
The conclusion of this study is that there is a strong probability that the discipline of 
ITG will be impacted by Blockchain should it become more widely adopted. There are 
sufficient reasons that governance institutes like ISACA, ITIL and the ISO should 
extend their frameworks to include new models of governance that encompass DAOs. 
However, given that DAOs are still at their infancy, it will take a reasonable number of 
years before this impact is felt fully in the IT industry. Nonetheless, it is clear from the 
evidence provided that corporate governance is facing a progressive disruption. 
This inference is based on the following: 
1. The majority of responses from the questionnaire confirm that an 
unconventional IT governance process is required in Blockchain based 
organisations. This is supported by the case study and Blockchain literature 
reviews. 
2. The emergence of Blockchain platforms like Ethereum, R3, EOS, NEO, 
DAOStack, and eInc as referenced in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 proves that 
decentralisation is a growing trend that has plausible effects on different 
professions. Ethereum is the largest operating system featuring smart contract 
functionality that hosts more than 2000 decentralised applications. The number 
has steadily grown since its launch. 
7.4. Strength of the chosen Research Design  
Chapter 4 highlighted the chosen research design and it served as the basis for the 
theoretical framework of this dissertation. Throughout the study it was imperative to 
critically asses the proposed theory using different methods. These methods included 
using opposing arguments to stimulate critical thinking, using triangulation in the data 
analysis and repeatedly reviewing and analysing the evidence holistically. These 
processes were time consuming but strictly followed to ensure the research 
maintained intellectual integrity. Given that the research was inductive, the researcher 
needed to tread carefully before forming the hypothesis. This was subsequently 
confirmed with the results of the questionnaire and knowledge gained from the case 
study on DAOStack. 
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The choice of epistemology was a well-suited philosophy for this study because it 
positioned the researcher to explore what is known to be true and how knowledge can 
be formed, disseminated and communicated (Datt, 2016). An intrinsic element of 
epistemology was used diligently in the analysis. This element is interpretivism.  
Due to the nature of qualitative studies, it was most appropriate to select interpretivism 
because it advocates the understanding of differences or similarities between humans 
in their roles as social actors (Singh & Nayak, 2015). Interpretivism is based on how 
one interprets social roles in accordance with the meaning one gives to these roles. 
This philosophy allowed the research to be exploratory, which supports the goal of 
discovering the possibilities of this modern technology. 
7.5. Research Limitations 
While every effort was made to provide strong research, there have been limitations 
that must be declared and discussed. The limitations to this research are the following:  
7.5.1. Limited sampling 
While the data collected and analysed was valuable, investigating a larger sample 
could have yielded stronger results. Yet, this would be a challenging task for any 
researcher at this stage as there is a lack of subject matter experts who possess both 
corporate governance and Blockchain knowledge and experience (Gartner, 2018). 
7.5.2. Cross sectional time horizon 
The time constraint was an inevitable shortcoming but a noteworthy one, nonetheless. 
This empirical study reflects the state of Blockchain technology at a particular moment 
in time. Although this chosen method of study provided theoretical answers to the 
research questions, it did not provide quantitative data that proves that Blockchain has 
a scientific and a measurable impact on IT governance.  
In saying that, it must be mentioned that governance itself is not simple to measure 
quantitatively. According to a study at the University of Cambridge (Schnyder, 2012) 
measuring governance is extremely complex, and while methodological efforts and 
innovations are laudable, they will remain pointless as long as new methodological 
approaches are applied to fundamentally flawed measurements. Thus, a longitudinal 
approach could offer better results to examine to the long-term effects of the 
technology on corporate governance. 
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7.5.3. Lack of existing quantitative data 
Another significant shortcoming was the lack of quantitative data on this topic. This 
weighed heavily on the decision to opt for a qualitative study instead.  
The phenomenon in this research is futuristic and theoretical. It is predicted to affect 
various sectors of the economy in the future (Swan, 2015; Mougayar & Buterin, 2016). 
For instance, the thought experiment in Chapter 5 that spoke about autonomous taxis 
in the year 2050, where leaderless organisations will become prevalent. Another 
example is the prediction that by 2030, most of world trade will be conducted 
leveraging Blockchain technology (Valde & Mitselmakher, 2018).  
It is challenging to gather quantitative data when the phenomenon will likely occur in 
years to come. This is a significant limitation to this cross-sectional study because it 
means the researcher must rely upon qualitative data to confirm the hypothesis. Hence 
the research design was formulated to support an inductive style of reasoning.  
7.6. Recommendations for further research 
This research proves that there are epistemological issues surrounding the nature and 
scope of knowledge of Blockchain technology. These issues are a result of the 
coupling between the physical and virtual domains, where the relationship between 
the two variables is unconfirmed (Swan & De Filippi, Toward a Philosophy on 
Blockchain: A Symposium, 2017).  
One of the challenges in establishing correspondence between these two domains is 
due to the different natures of these two worlds: the virtual world is quantitative (digital 
ones and zeros), and the physical world is qualitative (chaotic, variable, irrational) 
(Swan & De Filippi, 2017). 
With a lack of widespread knowledge on these ideologies, there are a limited existing 
guideline on the implications of Blockchain on ITG, particularly for roles like CIO and 
CTO. 
In due course the experimental process to identify the computational equivalents of 
human-based qualities such as ethics, trust and truth, will continue. With that being 
said, it is recommended that further research projects address the following areas: 
• Framework designs for effective DAO governance. 
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• Longitudinal study of the advantages and disadvantages of DAOs. 
• The adjustments of IT governance frameworks and certifications to 
include decentralised business models.  
• The need for a formal certification that focuses on decentralised 
business models. 
7.7. Contribution to the Industry 
Notwithstanding the research limitations, this study has been a uniquely useful 
contribution to the IT industry because there currently very few studies that focus on 
this topic. 
One of the aims of this research was to build a new theory. With the help of subject 
matter experts, the findings help shape and substantiate the ideology of modern 
governance in the fourth industrial revolution. This research can be used as a platform 
for further research or as a guideline for individuals who would like to explore the 
implications of Blockchain technology. 
The researcher was driven to fill the gaps observed in existing empirical literature of 
IT governance, as well as the gaps in Blockchain technology. These gaps are centred 
on decentralised business models that are causing disruption in the payments 
industry, in supply chain and in governance.  The findings contribute to the ITG body 
of knowledge by providing insight and in-depth examination of the variables that form 
decentralisation and how they affect roles like CIO and CTO.  
With this research, fellow members of academia, Blockchain entrepreneurs, 
governance institutes and industry professionals can take away the following lessons: 
• Blockchain can be applied to more than just cryptocurrencies. 
• Disintermediation does not necessarily eliminate executive roles; 
however, they can alter the requirements of these roles. 
• IT Governance frameworks have room for improvement and must 
advance with the changes in technology. 
• A growing number of communities are beginning to create their own self-
governed eco-systems. 
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• Tacit knowledge, business ethics and intuition have not been substituted 
by Blockchain and are still key requirements for decision-making.  
• Leadership in organisations is being redefined. It is less control-based 
and more influence oriented. 
7.8. Final Word 
It has been said that every thesis must tell a compelling story (Hewitt, 2001). This 
journey has been an insightful experience for the researcher and hopefully for the 
reader too. The story began with a proposed theory which resulted in months of 
research and analysis. After a lengthy process of critical thinking, a conclusion was 
drawn to which the research questions were answered, and from which the 
substantive aim was achieved. 
This story was not written to exist in isolation, it becomes a stepping stone for future 
research and developments in IT governance, just as other studies were a stepping 
stone for this one. As such, each body of work must deliver a robust argument so as 
not to compromise the standards of academia. Throughout the process of telling this 
story, the researcher faced challenges, limitations and setbacks, thankfully this did not 
dictate the validity and strength of the final outcome, but rather formed considerations 
for future studies.  
This study demonstrated that the concepts and features of Blockchain can be 
extended to a variety of situations, IT governance being only one of them.  
Creating this body of work has been humbly rewarding. The researcher’s passion for 
the evolution of corporate disciplines will hopefully inspire others to think outside the 
box as we venture into the fourth industrial revolution.  
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9. APPENDIX A: Questionnaire Invitation Letter 
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 
DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
Research project name: _The Impact of Blockchain Technology on I.T 
Governance 
Participant Information Sheet 
We would like to invite you to take part in the above-named study but before you decide, 
please read the following information. 
What is the purpose of this study? 
The purpose of the study is to suggest the effect that blockchain technology will have on 
hierarchical organisations that transition into Decentralised Autonomous Organisations 
(DAOs). The data collection will be conducted, along with case studies to compare the 
governance roles and responsibilities required in DAOs versus in hierarchical organisations. 
Who is doing the study? 
The study is being conducted by Melina M. Katende. A Masters Researcher at the Department 
of Applied Information Systems at the University of Johannesburg. Melina completed her 
Honours and undergrad at Kingsway Campus, majoring in Informatics and I.T Management. 
Who is being asked to participate? 
• IT Directors in Blockchain organisations are being asked to participate. 
• Experts in Decentralised Autonomous Organisations. This may include Authors, Speakers, 
CEOs. 
Your rights as a research participant 
Participation in this study is completely voluntary and anonymous. Information gathered 
during the research will be used solely for the purpose of this study and all efforts will be made 
to ensure the confidentiality of participants’ personal information. Please note that while your 
name will be recorded with the data, it will not be used in the report. All identifiable data will 
be stored securely on a computer with password-restricted access and only the researcher 
will have access to it. All identifiable information will be destroyed at the end of the study or 
after 3 years, whichever comes first. If you decide not to participate there will not be any 
negative consequences. Please be aware that if you decide to participate, you may withdraw 
from the study at any time and your data will be destroyed. You may also decide not to answer 
any specific question. 
Benefits to Participants and Others 
This research is inductive and aimed at building a new theory. Your contribution will help 
shape and substantiate the ideology of modern governance in Blockchain organisations. 
Ultimately this research can be used as a platform for further research or as a guideline for 
individuals or organisations who would like to explore Blockchain in the future. 
Expected Duration of the Questionnaire 
15 -20 minutes. 
What will happen to the results of the study? 
The results will be collated, synthesized using thematic coding and used as a basis for the 
qualitative analysis. The data collected from the Typeform questionnaire will be destroyed 
after 8 months. The Typeform account and questionnaire will no longer be active after the 
end of the Data collection period. 
Feedback 
If you would like to read the research at the end, kindly fill out your email address at the end 
of the questionnaire. The full dissertation will be made available upon approval. 
For any other queries please contact the Researcher: 
Melina M. Katende 
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10. APPENDIX B: Questionnaire Responses 
RESPONDENT Variable ANSWER 
 RESPONDENT#1 QUESTION1 If the DAO needs a physical organisation, the stakeholders will assign an MD of the DAO 
 RESPONDENT#1 QUESTION2 
It must be ensured by documented business processes that are agreed upon and signed of 
by ll stakeholders. The IT director should guarantee that only agreed policy is implemented 
in code. An IT director will never be responsible alone, 'product management' & operations 
will be responsible for defining, IT director will be responsible for correct development, 
implementation and support 
 RESPONDENT#1 QUESTION3 
No, the value must be there for it's members. They should gain from process optimisations 
/ increased efficiency, increased product or service, increased competitive advantage,... 
that justifies investments 
 RESPONDENT#1 QUESTION4 Yes of course 
 RESPONDENT#1 QUESTION5 
Yes he needs tools to manage and reports why the DAO has reason to exists, so yes 
results should be shared to stakeholders as with any other organisation, internal 
management reporting and external reporting as required by law 
 RESPONDENT#1 QUESTION6 
By putting all thinkable security measure's in place, having risk specialists covering this and 
reporting on it. And no never the responsibility of the IT director alone, but risk mitigating 
measures are always part of the total management debate for the board. A specific 
measure can be advised from a security perspective, but too expensive for running an 
cost-effective business, so it should be decided in a board to implement/not implement 
 RESPONDENT#1 QUESTION7 
With implementation technical and legal barriers and on the soft side with creating a 
culture of  high ethical standards 
 RESPONDENT#2 QUESTION1 
I think the DAO still needs some type of charter document, even if it is an online click 
through, specifying roles and responsibilities. How much and who tests smart contracts 
before they go live, what is the incident response protocol in case the smart contract or 
Dapps are misused, what is the SLA expectation around implementing new versions of a 
ledger protocol. 
 RESPONDENT#2 QUESTION2 
I believe in a consortium operator role. The members of the DAO would choose a technical 
operator that does not transact as part of the DAO but performs DevOps, testing, security 
monitoring so that the other participants of the DAO can take assurance the Dapps, 
network and smart contracts are all operating as expected. 
 RESPONDENT#2 QUESTION3 
Firstly, DAOs should be run in the cloud where costs of goods sold could be standardized 
and mapped to the role each participant plays in the DAO. Second, the DAO operator 
should be paid by the participants for the services they provide around uptime, 
Dapps/smart contract quality development, etc. These can be done as a license 
agreement, governed via smart contract, that allow each member to measure their specific 
ROI. 
 RESPONDENT#2 QUESTION4 Yes I believe there is a business model around operating a DAO. 
 RESPONDENT#2 QUESTION5 
It depends on the charter of the DAO. This could be private or perhaps the voting 
members opt to make customer satisfaction public such that the DAO operator knows what 
is working and what needs improving. Use cases and business models will dictate this. 
 RESPONDENT#2 QUESTION6 
By implementing a rigorous information security risk management program. There have to 
be security standards for hardening the nodes the ledger protocol runs on. Networks 
should be continually monitored to ensure traffic is legitimately tied to smart contract and 
Dapp transactions. Smart contracts and Dapps themselves should undergo thorough 
testing, change management and DevOps procedures. 
 RESPONDENT#2 QUESTION7 
Information processed as part of DAO operations needs to be classified to determine levels 
of authorization required. If the DAO is processing financial or personal data, then the DAO 
operator should absolutely institute some type of KYC registration process to vet potential 
DAO participants prior to granting access to the network. This can all be done remotely so 
long as it involves two-factor identity checks. 
 RESPONDENT#3 QUESTION1 
That totally depends on the structure of the DAO. The question implies that project 
management would be different from any other projects. But is that really the case? 
 RESPONDENT#3 QUESTION2 
Again, it really depends on what is actually meant by "a DAO". There is no universal 
definition, let alone an actual definition of the processes and relationships that are "coded" 
into a DAO's infrastructure. Code cannot describes arbitrary processes that are followed by 
people in sufficient detail. That is why the phrase "code is law" is questionable at best. 
There is always discretionary space for decision making by human beings that is unlikely to 
be caputed by . Otherwise, it could follow the processes already employed by large 
software release cycles like the Java community recently adopted. 
 RESPONDENT#3 QUESTION3 
Scaling is not achieved by hardware, but by software architecture (which then might 
require more or less resources). To me it is unclear, what is meant by "privately" in this 
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context. The system might expose metrics that capture the results of a previous measure 
(more or less adequately - dependent on the definition). 
 RESPONDENT#3 QUESTION4 No. 
 RESPONDENT#3 QUESTION5 The question is: Why should that be different from any other project/business? 
 RESPONDENT#3 QUESTION6 
What kind of risks are we talking about (technical, organizaional, monetary, process?)? If it 
is an open system (public blockchain), one cannot effectively prevent majority of 
hashpower attacks. Hacks are prevented as in any other IT project/system, why would that 
be different? Is a hard fork a risk and for whom? The possibility of a hard fork is the direct 
consequence of choosing DAO as an organisational model. Preventing it is people business 
and communication/ effort. 
 RESPONDENT#3 QUESTION7 
Same answer as to the previous question. A hack by an individual has nothing to do with 
teams working remote/in virtual teams - that is common practice even today in many 
companies that are spread around the globe. So a DAO does not differe w.r.t. to project 
and team management imo. 
 RESPONDENT#4 QUESTION1 
Perhaps. But it would seem to me that the entire purpose of DAOs as originally conceived 
was to automate governance. 
 RESPONDENT#4 QUESTION2 
I imagine you'd need some division between the person/group managing the governance 
protocol and the community to which the DAO serves (which presumably are the ones 
making the decisions over how those protocols are organized). 
 RESPONDENT#4 QUESTION3 No idea. 
 RESPONDENT#4 QUESTION4 Wouldn't that be in the eye of the beholder? 
 RESPONDENT#4 QUESTION5 
I presume it would be similar to typical corporations (again, assuming a capitalist 
economy). 
 RESPONDENT#4 QUESTION6 No idea. 
 RESPONDENT#4 QUESTION7 Not sure. 
 RESPONDENT#5 QUESTION1 
Don't understand what you really mean, but I would assume that employees themselves 
get together in workshops and create their processes themselves with the mentoring on 
the side of a process consultant. 
 RESPONDENT#5 QUESTION2 CIO, CTO types can just trace events on the blockchain. 
 RESPONDENT#5 QUESTION3 
Run everything in trusted cloud provider. Clouds are super cheap and scale by themselves. 
Nothing then must be worried about. 
 RESPONDENT#5 QUESTION4 
Of course. But why must a director "maintain" that? Just immutably store key events of 
processes in a set of blockchains and that is enough. Please get over this top-down 
thinking here. DAOs are all about P2P collaboration. 
 RESPONDENT#5 QUESTION5 
Yes sure, store only KPIs in the blockchains. No point in storing noise on blockchains like in 
cryptokitties.  Keep the noise off chain on regular storing devices. 
 RESPONDENT#5 QUESTION6 
I can not answer this question because the notion of "risk" is a blackbox that could mean 
anything. If you give me a specific risk then I can give you a concrete answer, I suppose. 
 RESPONDENT#5 QUESTION7 
The DAO hack happened because of the security reviews of the crowdfunding smart-
contract code was carried out in the most absurd way. Consequently, there was a protocol 
exploitation case that resulted in some $60 million being taken out by the exploiter. A 
technical response would be to perform proper security checks with tool support. That is 
not possible with Solidity as this language is not rooted in mathematical semantics, 
differently to smart-contract languages such as Haskell, Erlang, OCaml, etc. 
 RESPONDENT#6 QUESTION1 
Initially through human intervention, with programming protocols set directly for 
management of projects. Later on, mechanisms can be coded within a DAO. 
 RESPONDENT#6 QUESTION2 
Oversight on an ex-ante and ex-post basis. Ex ante, the code and protocols of the DAO 
should be implemented carefully before organisational deployment. Ex post, human 
oversight at regular intervals. 
 RESPONDENT#6 QUESTION3 
Calculating ROI does not change philosophically, it is the increment of return divided by 
the outlay of investment, expressed as a %. This calculation can be done privately for 
internal use, or externally as part of a wider transparency initiative, which is one of the 
goals of DAOs (to be transparent). 
 RESPONDENT#6 QUESTION4 Accurate, yes; private, oerhaps but not necessarily 
 RESPONDENT#6 QUESTION5 Yes but it would face the same survey limitations that exist in traditional methodologies 
 RESPONDENT#6 QUESTION6 
A cybersecurity architecture is necessary as in traditional organisations. The difference is 
that security must be the leading priority in the function of the DAO. 
 RESPONDENT#6 QUESTION7 
IT directors must be proactive in assessing risks and deploying preventive tools, rather 
than await a crisis. But there is no foolproof way to totally secure a DAO 
 RESPONDENT#7 QUESTION1 
No.  It would require a collaborative leadership role where all stakeholders are equally 
accountable determined by their contribution to a project. A larger emphasis will be put on 
self organised structures rather than appointed ones 
 RESPONDENT#7 QUESTION2 
With a clear focus on establishing trusted and transparent communication channels it is not 
solely the IT directors responsibility alone 
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 RESPONDENT#7 QUESTION3 
Consensus mechanisms underpinning objective and transparent reporting mechanism will 
provide data that is public and open to discussion 
 RESPONDENT#7 QUESTION4 No 
 RESPONDENT#7 QUESTION5 
Metrics are important however they need to be relevant and driving intended behaviours. 
KPI s should focus on incetive model and should be transparent and objective 
 RESPONDENT#7 QUESTION6 
Effective scenario planning strategies which are constantly reviewed. Risk mitigation is a 
collective responsibility 
 RESPONDENT#7 QUESTION7 
Know Your Colleague (KYC). A new term which will become more common in the future 
and is linked back to individuals taking back ownership of their digital identities. In a future 
world where immutable trust will make it more difficult for deception and IT directors will 
need to adapt to different recruitment screening processes when hiring and assessing an 
agent's ability to be trusted 
 RESPONDENT#8 QUESTION1 
We are not there yet, figuring out the governance models of the future, including how to 
implement programmes will require a lot of expirementation. 
 RESPONDENT#8 QUESTION2 
Well just like Bitcoin does not have a individual governance group (cio, ceo, cto, cisco...), 
the network in itself is comprised of a governing body of developers of blockchain. They 
would be responsible for maintaining the protocol as a group. 
 RESPONDENT#8 QUESTION3 
scaling would have to be based on the consensus of the group. there are groups of 
individuals that have forked from ethereum and bitcoin and it has worked for them. 
 RESPONDENT#8 QUESTION4 No. If it is private it is no longer decentralised. 
 RESPONDENT#8 QUESTION5 
they could make it part of the protocol. and install a separate application layer to calculate 
those figures. 
 RESPONDENT#8 QUESTION6 
Risk is shared in a DAO. that is why it is risky to invest in ICO because you are not sure of 
the outcome yet are part of the ecosystem. 
 RESPONDENT#8 QUESTION7 
although you do not know all participants in a decentralise network, trust can be built over 
time by observing individual's activity history on the system. that would probably require 
another application to report on activity. 
 RESPONDENT#9 QUESTION1 This is something to explore. 
 RESPONDENT#9 QUESTION2 
Depending on the lifecycle of the DAO, either the founder or the network of people could 
decide on the governance protocol. In the begining, the first few people get to decide on 
thta, they would be responsible for ensuring the protocol is aligned with business rules and 
policies. But in terms of enforcement of the protocol, no selected people have all the 
control legally or technically. 
 RESPONDENT#9 QUESTION3 incentivizing users to contribute would ensure that the software is optimal for all users. 
 RESPONDENT#9 QUESTION4 No 
 RESPONDENT#9 QUESTION5 
run an ICO before launching and hope for the best. there are no guarantees on 
stakeholder satisfaction once the DAO is launched. 
 RESPONDENT#9 QUESTION6 
there will always be risks, regulatory, market and technical risks. this would be the 
responsibility of the group as a whole. there is no way a single director could oversee all 
the risks if the blockchain scales as large as bitcoin for example. 
 RESPONDENT#9 QUESTION7 
similar to previous question. network would have to manage risks and be incentives to do 
so 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
QUESTION1 
A programme could be implemented over different life cycles in the DAO, but that needs to 
be coded. 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
QUESTION2 get volunteers to assist. and provide incentives. 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
QUESTION2 
some DAOs seek the direction of external policy advisors but still allow the network to 
makes its own decisions. Its all quite flexible. 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
QUESTION3 
set hard coded rules on productivity. Nothing wrong with suspending unproductive 
members in a private DAO. if the protocol allows 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
QUESTION4 
Yes. Its the heart of capitalism. many confuse Blockchain and economic systems. 
Companies can still use the technology whilst being capitalists, which gives them the right 
keep certain information private. 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
QUESTION5 
anyone in the world , including stakeholders can participate in DAOs. If you work with 
something like Aragon, you can see the governance model playing out in real time and see 
people's voting. so you'd be able to access metrics related to stakeholder satisfaction that 
way. 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
QUESTION6 they'd have to observe the network often or could appoint blockchain auditors. 
RESPONDENT#10 QUESTION7 
If its a private or consortium blockchain, they would have to do background checks just 
the same wayas hierarchical organisations. 
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11. APPENDIX C – Data Coding Allocation 
* The original text from Respondents has not been edited and therefore may include typing errors. 
Question Respondent Text* Code Reason for Code Allocation. 
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#1 
It must be ensured by documented business processes that are agreed upon and signed of by the 
stakeholders. The IT director should guarantee that only agreed policy is implemented in code. An 
IT director will never be responsible alone, 'product management' & operations will be responsible 
for defining, IT director will be responsible for correct development, implementation and support 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This sentiment is leans more towards conventional 
governance because it includes traditional methods of 
assigning roles. This is typically found in the RACI charts.  
QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#1 
No, the value must be there for it's members. They should gain from process optimisations / 
increased efficiency, increased product or service, increased competitive advantage, that justifies 
investments 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This emphasises community and the distribution of benefits for 
all. A common theme of decentralization.  
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#1 Yes of course. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#1 
Yes he needs tools to manage and reports why the DAO has reason to exists, so yes results 
should be shared to stakeholders as with any other organisation, internal management reporting 
and external reporting as required by law 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This is the same process that hierarchical organisations run.  
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#1 
By putting all thinkable security measure's in place, having risk specialists covering this and 
reporting on it. And no never the responsibility of the IT director alone, but risk mitigating 
measures are always part of the total management debate for the board. A specific measure can 
be advised from a security perspective, but too expensive for running a cost-effective business, so 
it should be decided in a board to implement/not implement 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This is the same risk management process that hierarchical 
organisations run. It is mentioned in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#1 
With implementation technical and legal barriers and on the soft side with creating a culture of  
high ethical standards 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
Creating ethical standards is something that is usually done in 
hierarchical organisations because it requires communication, 
awareness and team building.  
QUESTION1  RESPONDENT#2 
I think the DAO still needs some type of charter document, even if it is an online click through, 
specifying roles and responsibilities. How much and who tests smart contracts before they go live, 
what is the incident response protocol in case the smart contract or Dapps are misused, what is 
the SLA expectation around implementing new versions of a ledger protocol. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
The respondent mentioned a conventional practice but 
suggested an unconventional way of achieving it. 
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#2 
I believe in a consortium operator role. The members of the DAO would choose a technical 
operator that does not transact as part of the DAO but performs DevOps, testing, security 
monitoring so that the other participants of the DAO can take assurance the Dapps, network and 
smart contracts are all operating as expected. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not something mentioned in COBIT 5. There is a 
mention of Dapps and smart contracts. Which are common 
attributes of decentralization.  
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QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#2 
Firstly, DAOs should be run in the cloud where costs of goods sold could be standardized and 
mapped to the role each participant plays in the DAO. Second, the DAO operator should be paid 
by the participants for the services they provide around uptime, Dapps/smart contract quality 
development, etc. These can be done as a license agreement, governed via smart contract, that 
allow each member to measure their specific ROI. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
The respondent mentioned a conventional practice but 
suggested an unconventional way of achieving it. 
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#2 Yes I believe there is a business model around operating a DAO. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#2 
It depends on the charter of the DAO. This could be private or perhaps the voting members opt to 
make customer satisfaction public such that the DAO operator knows what is working and what 
needs improving. Use cases and business models will dictate this. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
The respondent mentioned a conventional practice but 
suggested an unconventional way of achieving it. 
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#2 
By implementing a rigorous information security risk management program. There have to be 
security standards for hardening the nodes the ledger protocol runs on. Networks should be 
continually monitored to ensure traffic is legitimately tied to smart contract and Dapp transactions. 
Smart contracts and Dapps themselves should undergo thorough testing, change management 
and DevOps procedures. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This process is almost exactly what is mentioned in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#2 
Information processed as part of DAO operations needs to be classified to determine levels of 
authorization required. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#2 
If the DAO is processing financial or personal data, then the DAO operator should absolutely 
institute some type of KYC registration process to vet potential DAO participants prior to granting 
access to the network. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This sentiment advocates for conventional ways of accessing 
information. It is restrictive and leads  to centralized 
governance.  
QUESTION1  RESPONDENT#3 
That totally depends on the structure of the DAO. The question implies that project management 
would be different from any other projects. But is that really the case? 
Ambiguous 
This answer is ambiguous because it does not mention any 
processes that are exclusively conventional or unconventional 
governance. It mentions project management which is 
separate to governance. Hence why it has been excluded as a 
governance process.  
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#3 
Again, it really depends on what is actually meant by "a DAO". There is no universal definition, let 
alone an actual definition of the processes and relationships that are "coded" into a DAO's 
infrastructure. Code cannot describes arbitrary processes that are followed by people in sufficient 
detail. That is why the phrase "code is law" is questionable at best. There is always discretionary 
space for decision making by human beings that is unlikely to be caputed by . Otherwise, it could 
follow the processes already employed by large software release cycles like the Java community 
recently adopted. 
Ambiguous 
This statement speaks of unconventional processes, the main 
sentiment is ambiguous . The respondent uses terms like "It 
Depends" … indicating that it could be either conventional or 
unconventional.  
QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#3 
Scaling is not achieved by hardware, but by software architecture (which then might require more 
or less resources). To me it is unclear, what is meant by "privately" in this context. The system 
might expose metrics that capture the results of a previous measure (more or less adequately - 
dependent on the definition). 
Ambiguous 
The respondent was unsure about the meaning of the 
question. This answer is not straightforward and was therefore 
coded as Ambiguous. 
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#3 No 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
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QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#3 The question is: Why should that be different from any other project/business? 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This statement implies that there is no difference between 
regular hierarchical and decentralised governance.  
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#3 
What kind of risks are we talking about (technical, organizaional, monetary, process?)? If it is an 
open system (public blockchain), one cannot effectively prevent majority of hashpower attacks. 
Hacks are prevented as in any other IT project/system, why would that be different? Is a hard fork 
a risk and for whom? The possibility of a hard fork is the direct consequence of choosing DAO as 
an organizational model. Preventing it is people business and communication/ effort. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This answer reveals that perhaps the question was unclear to 
the respondent. However, the main sentiment is relates to 
conventional governance approaches.  
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#3 Preventing it is people business and communication/ effort. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This is question was about risk management. It is a typical 
process outlined in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#3 
Same answer as to the previous question. A hack by an individual has nothing to do with teams 
working remote/in virtual teams - that is common practice even today in many companies that are 
spread around the globe. So a DAO does not differe w.r.t. to project and team management imo. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
 Same as above. 
QUESTION1  RESPONDENT#4 
Perhaps. But it would seem to me that the entire purpose of DAOs as originally conceived was to 
automate governance. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This seems to be an assumption, but the sentiment leans 
clearly toward unconventional governance.  
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#4 
I imagine you'd need some division between the person/group managing the governance protocol 
and the community to which the DAO serves (which presumably are the ones making the 
decisions over how those protocols are organized) 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#4 No idea. Ambiguous Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#4 Wouldn't that be in the eye of the beholder? Ambiguous Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#4 I presume it would be similar to typical corporations (again, assuming a capitalist economy). 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This is the second mention of capitalism, which is closely 
related to open free markets that often lead to oligopolies and 
centralisation. Therefore, this sentiment leans more toward 
conventional centralised governance.  
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#4 No idea. Ambiguous Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#4 Not sure. Ambiguous Self-Explanatory. 
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QUESTION1  RESPONDENT#5 
Don't understand what you really mean, but I would assume that employees themselves get 
together in workshops and create their processes themselves with the mentoring on the side of a 
process consultant. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#5 CIO, CTO types can just trace events on the blockchain. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not something specified in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#5 Run everything in trusted cloud provider. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This answer has both conventional and ambiguous 
sentiments. It is common nowadays to run certain parts of 
enterprises online.  
QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#5 
Run everything in trusted cloud provider. Clouds are super cheap and scale by themselves. 
Nothing then must be worried about. 
Ambiguous 
In the second part of this response to Question 3, there is no 
definitive sentiment of unconventional or conventional 
governance. The respondent says nothing must be worried 
about but does not mention what that entails.  
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#5 
Of course. But why must a director "maintain" that? Just immutably store key events of processes 
in a set of blockchains and that is enough. Please get over this top-down thinking here. DAOs are 
all about P2P collaboration. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#5 
Yes sure, store only KPIs in the blockchains. No point in storing noise on blockchains like in 
cryptokitties.  Keep the noise off chain on regular storing devices. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#5 
I can not answer this question because the notion of "risk" is a blackbox that could mean 
anything. If you give me a specific risk then I can give you a concrete answer, I suppose. 
Ambiguous Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#5 
The DAO hack happened because of the security reviews of the crowdfunding smart-contract 
code was carried out in the most absurd way. Consequently, there was a protocol exploitation 
case that resulted in some $60 million being taken out by the exploiter. A technical response 
would be to perform proper security checks with tool support. That is not possible with Solidity as 
this language is not rooted in mathematical semantics, differently to smart-contract languages 
such as Haskell, Erlang, OCaml, etc. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not a typical process as explained in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION1  RESPONDENT#6 
Initiappy through hunan intervention, with programming protocols set directly for management of 
projects. Later on, mechanisms can be coded within a DAO. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not a typical process as explained in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#6 
Oversight on an ex-ante and ex-post basis. Ex ante, the code and protocols of the DAO should be 
implemented carefully before organizstional deployment. Ex post, human oversight at regular 
intervals. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not a typical process as explained in COBIT 5.  
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QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#6 
Calculating ROI does not change philosophically, it is the increment of return divided by the outlay 
of investment, expressed as a %. This calculation can be done privately for internal use, 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#6 
or externally as part of a wider transparency initiative, which is one of the goals of DAOs (to be 
transparent). 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is a common theme of governance in DAOs. The 
respondent mentions transparency. This is not a typical 
process of hierarchical governance, to share all financial 
information with all employees. 
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#6 Accurate, yes; private, oerhaps but not necessarily 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This answer leans towards unconventional because it 
suggests that it is not necessary to keep certain information 
private. This is the main theme of decentralisation.  
QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#6 Yes but it would face the same survey limitations that exist in traditional methodologies 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#6 
A cybersecurity architecture is necessary as in traditional organizations. The difference is that 
security must be the leading priority in the function of the DAO. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
Cybersecurity strategies are common suggestion not only from 
COBIT 5 but ISO standards. These are difficult to implement in 
a central way in DAOs. 
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#6 
IT directors must be proactive in assessing risks and deploying preventiventools, rather than await 
a crisis. But there is no foolproof way to totally secure a DAO 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION1  RESPONDENT#7 
No.  It would require a collaborative leadership role where all stakeholders are equally 
accountable determined by their contribution to a project. A larger emphasis will be put on self 
organised structures rather than appointed ones 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#7 
With a clear focus on establishing trusted and transparent communication channels it is not solely 
the IT directors responsibility alone 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#7 
Consensus mechanisms underpinning objective and transparent reporting mechanism will provide 
data that is public and open to discussion 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#7 No 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#7 
Metrics are important however they need to be relevant and driving intended behaviours. KPI s 
should focus on incetive model and should be transparent and objective 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
 APPENDIX C – Data Coding Allocation 
144 
 
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#7 
Effective scenario planning strategies which are constantly reviewed. Risk mitigation is a 
collective responsibility 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This is a typical process as explained in COBIT 5. A Part of 
Risk Management is mitigation and regular monitoring. 
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#7 
Know Your Colleague (KYC). A new term which will become more common in the future and is 
linked back to individuals taking back ownership of their digital identities. In a future world where 
immutable trust will make it more difficult for deception and IT directors will need to adapt to 
different recruitment screening processes when hiring and assessing an agent's ability to be 
trusted 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is a new term that does not yet exist in COBIT 5, also the 
process introduces new aspect to governance.  
QUESTION1  RESPONDENT#8 
We are not there yet, figuring out the governance models of the future, including how to 
implement programmes will require a lot of expirementation. 
Ambiguous 
It appears the respondent is unsure what Programme would 
be implement. This is normal as it is still a new concept. 
However, the answer does not provide any definitive indication 
of conventional or unconventional. 
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#8 
Well just like Bitcoin does not have a individual governance group (cio, ceo, cto, cisco...), the 
network in itself is comprised of a governing body of developers of blockchain. They would be 
responsible for maintaining the protocol as a group. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#8 
scaling would have to be based on the consensus of the group. there are groups of individuals 
that have forked from ethereum and bitcoin and it has worked for them. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#8 No. If it is private it is no longer decentralised. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#8 
they could make it part of the protocol. and install a separate application layer to calculate those 
figures. 
Ambiguous 
This answer does not provide a definitive governance 
approach that is either conventional or unconventional.  
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#8 
Risk is shared in a DAO. that is why it is risky to invest in ICO because you are not sure of the 
outcome yet are part of the ecosystem. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is a typical scenario of Blockchain, ICOs. They operate 
using decentralisation and distribution. Not a conventional 
approach of organisation governance as laid out in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#8 
although you do not know all participants in a decentralise network, trust can be built over time by 
observing individual's activity history on the system. that would probably require another 
application to report on activity. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION1  RESPONDENT#9 this is somethign to explore. Ambiguous Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION2  RESPONDENT#9 
Depending on the lifecycle of the DAO, either the founder or the network of people could decide 
on the governance protocol. In the beginning, the first few people get to decide on thta, they 
would be responsible for ensuring the protocol is aligned with business rules and policies. But in 
terms of enforcement of the protocol, no selected people have all the control legally or technically 
Ambiguous 
The respondent mentions that this answer depends on 
different factors. This indicates that it could either be 
conventional or unconventional, therefore it is ambiguous. 
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QUESTION3  RESPONDENT#9 incentivising users to contribute would ensure that the software is optimal for all users. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not a typical process as explained in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION4  RESPONDENT#9 No 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Self-Explanatory. 
QUESTION5  RESPONDENT#9 
run an ICO before launching and hope for the best. there are no guarantees on stakeholder 
satisfaction once the DAO is launched. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
ICOs are a new phenomenon, not a typical process as 
explained in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION6  RESPONDENT#9 
there will always be risks, regulatory, market and technical risks. this would be the responsibility of 
the group as a whole. there is no way a single director could oversee all the risks if the blockchain 
scales as large as bitcoin for example. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not a typical process as explained in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION7  RESPONDENT#9 similar to previous question. network would have to manage risks and be incentives to do so 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
Same as above. 
QUESTION1 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
A programme could be implemented over different life cycles in the DAO, but that needs to be 
coded. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is a suggestion and quite creative. It is not a typical 
process as explained in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION2 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
get volunteers to assist. and provide incentives. some DAOs seek the direction of external policy 
advisors but still allow the network to makes its own decisions.its all quite flexible. 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not a typical process as explained in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION3 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
set hard coded rules on productivity.nothing wrong with suspending unproductive members in a 
private DAO. if the protocol allows 
Unconventional 
IT Governance 
This is not a typical process as explained in COBIT 5.  
QUESTION4 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
Yes. Its the heart of capitalism. many confuse Blockchain and economic systems. Companies can 
still use the technology whilst being capitalists, which gives them the right keep certain information 
private. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
Capitalism is an Economic system based on the private 
ownership , it typically results in the centralisation of 
information. 
QUESTION5 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
anyone in the world , including stakeholders can participate in DAOs. If you work with something 
like Aragon, you can see the governance model playing out in real time and see people's voting. 
so you'd be able to access metrics related to stakeholder satisfaction that way. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This practice of stakeholder management is common and 
suggested in COBIT 5. There is an emphasis on ensuring 
stakeholder satisfaction. Which is one of the core principles of 
COBIT 5. 
QUESTION6 
 
RESPONDENT#10 
they'd have to observe the network often or could appoint blockchain auditors. 
Conventional 
IT Governance 
This is synonymous with the control part of the hierarchical 
governance structure.  
 
